

**The Effect of Communicating a Social-Political Stance on Employee Motivation:
Field Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market Platform**

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Despite a recent surge in corporate activism, with firm leaders communicating about social-political issues unrelated to their core businesses, we know little about its strategic implications. This paper examines the effect of an employer communicating a stance about a social-political issue on employee motivation, using a two-phased field experiment in an online labor market platform. Results demonstrate that the treatment effects of taking a stance vary depending on whether the employee agrees or disagrees with the stance; I observe a demotivating effect of taking a stance on a social-political issue with which employees disagree, and no (statistically significant) motivating effect of taking a stance on a social-political issue with which employees agree. This study has important implications for the nascent scholarship on corporate activism, as well as the scholarship on strategic human capital management.

1. Introduction

There has been a surge in corporate social-political activism in recent years, wherein firm leaders communicate stances on social-political issues not directly related to their core business (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017, Dodd and Supa 2014). This includes twelve CEOs signing a letter to Texas Senator Greg Abbott against LGBTQ discriminatory legislation in May 2017, the CEO of Chick-fil-A making anti-same-sex-marriage statements in public interviews starting in 2011, and a number of Silicon Valley CEOs making strong moral opposition statements regarding immigration policy on Twitter, social media platforms, and in public interviews. CEOs have made statements both for and against issues like climate change, gun control, LGBTQ equality, racial equality, gender equality, healthcare, and immigration—topics that were once exclusively the domain of politicians, NGOs, and advocacy groups (Chatterji and Toffel 2016).

Despite the increasing prevalence of employers communicating stands on social-political issues, we know little about the strategic implications of doing so. Scholars have only recently begun to examine the impact of corporate activism on firm stakeholders, with Chatterji and Toffel's (2017) work examining the influence of CEO activism on public attitudes and consumers' stated intent to purchase, and Dodd and Supa's (2014) study of the effects of corporate social advocacy on consumers' stated intent to purchase. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the effect of an employer communicating a social-political stance on revealed (as opposed to stated) stakeholder behavior. This is also the first paper to examine the effect of communicating an employer's stance about a social-political issue on a critical stakeholder: the employee.

I implemented a two-phase field experiment on a prominent online labor market platform, Upwork, to study the effect of an employer communicating a stance about a social-political issue on worker motivation. Specifically, workers were first hired to conduct a translation job by an employer on Upwork, and were surveyed about their opinions about Upwork and other labor market platforms and, critical for the study, their opinions about a range of social-political issues. Based on the distribution of opinions about the range of social-political issues, one was identified as both polarizing and relatively evenly distributed on both sides of the opinion spectrum (both for and against the issue): support of gender-neutral bathrooms. Phase two of the experiment was conducted in collaboration with a real company; the company website indicated that it was "under construction" such that no confounding information could be discovered online. Workers who had filled out the survey were contacted on Upwork by the company to complete a translation job and, stratified by their previously-disclosed opinions about their support of gender-neutral bathrooms, were randomly assigned to receive a message that their employer supports gender-neutral bathrooms, is against gender-neutral bathrooms, or a control message. I then observed the effect of these company stance "treatments" on workers' motivation, depending on whether the worker agrees with, disagrees with, or is neutral about the issue. Importantly, worker opinions on the social-political issue were obtained during

phase one under the cover of a different employer, *before* the focal employer's stance on the issue was revealed during phase two, and without connection to focal employer. Given extant research which has shown that workers may face pressure to respond to managers' political requests (Hertel-Fernandez 2016, 2017), this was important to ensure no social desirability bias in workers' self-reported opinions about the social-political issue.

The person-organization fit and value congruence literature, as well as social identity theory, suggest that an employer communicating a stance on a contentious social or political issue should influence an employee's perceptions of and satisfaction with working for that employer which, in turn, should influence employee motivation and willingness to put forth extra effort on the job. Interestingly, I find there to be a significant demotivating effect if the employer takes a stance with which the employee disagrees, but no statistically significant motivating effect if the employer takes a stance with which the employee agrees, compared to the employer not taking a stance. These effects persist whether the company stance is for or against the social-political issue. This asymmetric effect can likely be explained by a false consensus effect (Marks and Miller 1987), wherein individuals overestimate the degree to which others share their social-political opinions and beliefs in the workplace. Given the false consensus effect, information that the employer disagrees with the worker's stance significantly updates workers' prior assumptions about their employer's social-political stance, whereas information that the employer agrees with the worker's stance does not update workers' prior beliefs about their employer's stance to the same degree. It is the *updating* of one's beliefs about others that has been shown to influence individuals' behavior in the related context of political protests, for example (Cantoni et al. 2017). Additionally, given a false consensus effect, information that the employer disagrees with the worker's stance would be surprising, as well as negative, whereas information that the employer agrees with the worker's stance would be unsurprising, as well as positive. It has been shown that reactions are greater to negative, surprising information than to positive, unsurprising information (Wong and Weiner 1981, Skowronski and Carlston 1989), including in work contexts (Brockner et al. 1990).

There has been increasing interest in conducting field experiments within strategy research (Chatterji et al. 2016), and a critical component to the field experiment implemented in this paper (List 2009) is that the workers complete their work in their real-world work context and are never made aware of their participation in a study. Given the importance of investigating a causal relationship between an employer taking a social-political stance and employee motivation (in which there are many endogenous factors that would be challenging to control for in a study using observational data across companies, for example), the pros of implementing a field experiment on this online labor marketplace outweigh the cons of examining worker behavior in a context that is not typical of that of a traditional employee-employer relationship and instead is more typical of that of workers and companies operating in the gig economy. I

discuss the generalizability of the setting and its implications for future work in more detail in the conclusion of this paper.

This paper contributes directly to the nascent literature on the strategic implications of corporate social-political activism (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017, Dodd and Supa 2014) and indirectly to the related, but distinct, scholarship on the influence of CEO political ideology, shown to influence the activist behavior of employees (Briscoe et al. 2014) and corporate social performance (Chin et al. 2013). This paper is, to my knowledge, the first to consider the effects of an employer communicating a stance on a social-political issue on a critical stakeholder: the employee. This paper's findings suggest that, from a strategic human capital perspective (Campbell et al. 2012a, 2012b, Coff 1997, Foss and Lindenberg 2013, Huselid et al. 1997, Koch and McGrath 1996, Pierce et al. 2015), there are potential costs of taking a social-political stance that goes against that of a company's current employees.

This paper contributes to a recent stream of literature leveraging field experiments in natural work settings to establish causal effects of different nonmarket strategies on revealed (rather than stated) employee behavior that is critical to the firm (Burbano 2016, 2019, Cassar and Meier 2018, Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2010, 2015). Existing work in this vein has not yet established the effects of the nonmarket strategy of focus in this paper – communicating about a social-political stance – on employee behavior. Existing work has furthermore generally focused on the positive, motivational effects of other non-market strategies rather than considering potential negative, demotivating effects; Cassar and Meier (2018) is one notable exception.¹ This paper's findings contribute to the scholarship that has theorized on the importance of value congruence between employees and the firm more broadly, but which has to date relied primarily on correlational survey evidence to demonstrate the effect of employer-employee value (in)congruence on employee (de)motivation (e.g., Cable and Edwards 2004, Edwards and Cable 2009, Goodman and Svyantek 1999, Cable and DeRue 2002, Hoffman and Woehr 2006, Kristof-Brown et al. 2005). Burbano (2019) and Cassar and Meier (2018) show causal experimental evidence that prosocially-oriented individuals are more responsive to charitable giving and prosocial incentive messaging. This paper suggests that social-political value congruence is another important type of “value” in person-organization fit as well. Given the setting of the field experiments, this paper furthermore has important implications for the emerging scholarship on motivating workers in the “gig” or “virtual” economy (Greenwood et al. 2017, Martins et al. 2004, Sundararajan 2016). From a practical perspective, these findings suggest that managers should be aware of whether their employees agree or disagree with the social-political issue in consideration and should be wary of the costs of taking a stance on social-political issues that are at odds with those of their employees.

¹ Cassar and Meier (2018) demonstrates a negative effect of prosocial incentives on worker effort when the prosocial incentives are performance-based and more instrumental.

2. Literature and Theory

2.1 Corporate Social-Political Activism

Corporate social-political activism is a relatively recent phenomenon. Though some have described corporate social-political activism as theoretically distinct from nonmarket strategy (Chatterji and Toffel 2017), in which firms work to influence government policies that are related to their core businesses (Baron 1995, 2013, Bonardi et al. 2006), recent studies suggest that there may be a link between taking a stance on social-political issues and stakeholder behavior such as that of consumers and the public, which are important to the bottom line (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017, Dodd and Supa 2014). This suggests that corporate social-political activism can be considered to be a type of nonmarket strategy, given its implications for firm performance. Two strands of nonmarket strategy in the literature which have mainly been treated as separate to date are strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR), which refers to corporate actions that advance a social good that allows a firm to enhance organizational performance, and strategic corporate political activity (CPA), which refers to corporate actions to manage political institutions and/or influence political actors in a way favorable to the firm (for a review, see Mellahi et al. 2016). Corporate social-political activism is a nonmarket strategy that falls in between or spans both, CSR and CPA.

2.2 Communication of a Social-Political Stance and Employee Motivation

Applications of the person-organization fit and value congruence literature, as well as social identity theory, suggest that an employer communicating a stance on a contentious social or political issue should influence an employee's perceptions of and satisfaction with working for that employer which, in turn, should influence employee motivation and willingness to put forth extra effort on the job.

Value congruence between an employee and an employing firm refers to the compatibility between the values and norms of an employee and those of the employer (Chatman 1989) and is critical to person-organization fit (Dineen and Noe 2009, Kristof-Brown et al. 2005, Kutcher et al. 2013). Employees will more favorably consider the qualities of their employers when those qualities are in line with their values. When an employee favorably compares an employer's qualities to those of others, self-image increases (Ashforth and Mael 1989, Brockner et al. 2014, Dutton and Dukerich 1991). Higher self-image and self-concept increase the attractiveness of categorizing oneself as part of an organization and, thus, increase job satisfaction and identification with the organization (Ashforth and Mael 1989, Brockner et al. 2014, Dutton and Dukerich 1991, Dutton et al. 1994, Greening and Turban 2000, Mael and Ashforth 1992), which results in employee attitudes and behaviors that benefit the firm (O'Reilly and Chatman 1986). Indeed, surveys have suggested that value congruence should influence important outcomes such as employee wellbeing (O'Reilly et al. 1991), employee creativity (Spanjol et al. 2015), positive attitudes towards the job and employer (Amos and Weathington 2008, Cable and Judge 1996, Kristof-Brown et al. 2005), contextual

performance (Goodman and Svyantek 1999), organizational citizenship behavior or prosocial organizational behavior (Cable and DeRue 2002), support for the organization's objective and putting in extra effort on the job (Arthur et al. 2006, Kristof-Brown and Guay 2011, Kristof-Brown et al. 2005), and job performance more broadly (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005, Hoffman and Woehr 2006). Experimental evidence from lab studies has also shown, for example, that when priming a team or organizational prosocial value, there is an interaction between prosocial personal preferences and organizational values and performance in a team contest (Andersson et al, 2017). One would thus expect an increase (decrease) in perceived person-organization fit or perceived value congruence, and resultingly, identification with the employer, on the part of the employee, to positively (negatively) affect such behavior as putting in extra effort on the job, and job performance more broadly.

An employer taking a stance on a social-political issue should thus influence employees' perceptions about value congruence and identification with their employer, depending on whether the employee agrees with the stance. In turn, this should affect workers' motivation and willingness to put extra effort on the job.

3. Empirical Setting and Field Experimental Design

I implement a field experiment on the online labor marketplace Upwork to examine a causal effect of an employer taking a stance for or against a social-political issue on workers' motivation (depending on whether they agree or disagree with the stance). Upwork is one of the most commonly used online labor marketplaces. Approximately 12 million freelancers use its platform to find jobs, with 5 million employers seeking on-demand talent on the site.² Upwork workers are more educated than the average U.S. freelancer, with 77 percent holding a college degree.³ Typical jobs take days or weeks to complete, and payment amounts are in the tens or hundreds of dollars. They include such categories as IT and programming, administrative support, translation, design and multimedia, and even engineering and manufacturing. The average hourly wage for U.S. freelancers on Upwork is \$28, which translates into an annual income of \$56,000 (Eha 2013) – comparable to the average annual U.S. household income.

The field experiment consisted of three phases: Job 1, Survey, and Job 2. IRB approval was obtained, and the study was pre-registered.⁴ At a high level, workers were first hired to complete translation

² Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, "Freelance marketplace Upwork opens Chicago office, expects staff of 100." Chicago Tribune. August 2, 2017.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-upwork-chicago-office-freelancer-economy-0802-biz-2-20170801-story.html>

³ Pawel Popiel, "'Boundaryless' in the creative economy: assessing freelancing on Upwork." *Critical Studies in Media Communication* Vol 34, 2017, available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15295036.2017.1282618>

⁴ Pre-registration will be shared publically after article acceptance; in the meantime, the author can be contacted for a copy of the pre-registration.

jobs on Upwork (“Job 1”), and then asked to complete a survey about their opinions on a number of topics, including a range of social-political issues. Their responses to the survey were analyzed to identify an issue on which the workers had a wide and relatively balanced distribution of opinions: “the Issue.” In collaboration with a real company, workers who completed the survey were contacted approximately a month after Job 1 to conduct a different translation job for a different employer (“Job 2”). At the beginning of Job 2, workers were randomly assigned to receive information that the company agrees with the issue, that the company disagrees with the issue, or to receive no information about company stance on the issue; random assignment of the three conditions was stratified based on their previously disclosed agreement, disagreement, and neutrality on the issue during the survey. I then observe their willingness to translate additional words, beyond what is required for payment, on Job 2, as well as the quality of the deliverable. The steps of the field experiment are depicted in Figure 1. I describe each of these steps in more detail below.

****Figure 1 here*****

4.1. Job 1

Thirteen translation jobs were advertised on Upwork: Translation from English to Arabic, English to Chinese, English to French, English to German, English to Greek, English to Hindi, English to Italian, English to Japanese, English to Korean, English to Portuguese, English to Russian, English to Spanish, English to Vietnamese.⁵ The job was to translate half a page of text from English to the indicated language, corresponding to 189 words of translation, for payment of \$10. Each job description indicated that the employer (an individual) was looking to translate numerous documents of multiple pages each and was looking to hire numerous Upworkers to get the job done relatively quickly. Interested applicants submitted a proposal on the Upwork website. All workers who submitted complete proposals and were willing to accept the offered payment amount for the job (\$10) were hired. After being hired, all workers received a message via the Upwork communication portal that included their instructions for the job, namely, to translate a document from English to the non-English language. All workers who submitted the deliverable were paid. 1,237 workers completed Job 1.

4.2. Survey

Once workers submitted the deliverable, they received a thank you message that also requested that they fill out an optional survey.⁶ The survey included questions about their opinions about Upwork payment

⁵ This phase of the study took place in one month, starting on Jan 29, 2019.

⁶ All workers received this message message: “Thank you very much for your work. I will mark the job as complete so that you can receive your payment through Upwork. Also, I am interested in learning about whether the Upwork platform works well for

amount, as well as numerous social-political issues, including gun control, immigration, climate change, and LGBTQ equality, to name a few. Embedded in the unique survey link sent to each worker was an identifier used to link the workers' responses to the survey to their identity in Job 1 and in Job 2.

Workers' survey responses about their opinions on a range of social-political issues were used to identify a social-political issue about which there is a wide and relatively balanced range of opinions. Table 1 shows the distribution of opinions on each of the social-political issues included in the survey. The sample size corresponding to each question varies slightly since workers were not forced to answer these questions; they could leave blank a given question answer. While opinions on the majority of the social-political issues were quite skewed on either the "agree" or "disagree" ends of the spectrum, two issues emerged as both polarizing and having a disperse distribution: the legalization of recreational marijuana and gender neutral bathroom facilities (agreement with the statements "Recreational marijuana should be legal" and "I support gender neutral bathroom facilities, which are physically accessible and open to people of any gender"). The issue of gender neutral bathroom facilities was selected for use in Job 2.

**** Table 1 here****

Workers were grouped into the categories "Employees Agrees with Issue," "Employees Neutral about Issue," and "Employees Disagrees with Issue" based on their responses to the question about gender neutral bathrooms for stratification of random assignment of conditions during Job 2. Workers were grouped into the "Employees Agree with Issue" bucket if they "somewhat agreed," "agreed," or "strongly agreed" with the gender neutral bathroom statement. They were grouped into the "Employees Disagree with Issue" bucket if they "somewhat disagreed," "disagreed," or "strongly disagreed" with the statement. They were grouped into the "Employees Neutral about Issue" bucket if they "neither agreed nor disagreed" with the statement.

4.3. Job 2

The same workers who completed the survey were contacted approximately one month later on Upwork by a different employer (a collaborating company) to complete translation jobs.⁷ Importantly, at the time of the study the company website did not reflect any information about the company other than to indicate that it was under construction. Thus, if workers had googled the name of the company they would have found it to be a real, incorporated entity, but without any confounding information in its internet presence. This was important for the internal validity of the study to ensure that information about the

its workers. Would you be willing to complete this survey about your experience on Upwork and your opinions about issues that are important to you? (It should take only 3-5 minutes of your time) Here is the link to survey: [Unique Qualtrics survey link]. It is optional (of course not required for payment for this job), but I would really appreciate it if you have a few minutes to fill it out."

⁷The Job 2 phase of the study took place between March 9 and April 14, 2019. Workers were contacted between 21 days and 39 days after completion of Job 1.

company online not influence opinions about the social-political stance of the company outside of the author's control within the experiment.

Workers were recruited directly on Upwork to translate a document in the same language as the one they had completed in Job 1.⁸ The job was to translate one page of text from English to the indicated language, corresponding to 246 words of translation, for payment of \$15. It was noted that if they were willing to translate more than the first page of the attached document (the total document was 9 pages), this would be helpful for the employer, but that doing so was not required to receive full payment, nor would it influence their feedback ratings or likelihood of being hired again.

Random assignment to conditions was stratified by workers' previously-disclosed (surveyed) opinions about gender-neutral bathrooms (randomly assigned within Employees Agree with Issue, Employees Disagree with Issue, and Employees Neutral about Issue groupings). Workers were randomly assigned to one of two treatment conditions, and a control, within stratified groups: (1) An *Employer Agrees with Issue* group received information that the company is in support of gender neutral bathroom; (2) an *Employer Does Not Agree with Issue* group received information that the company is against gender neutral bathroom; (3) a *Control* group received information generic information about the employer. See Figure 2 for the exact messages corresponding to each condition. These condition messages were not sent until workers accepted the contracted job on Upwork to minimize selection bias. All workers were paid after submitting their deliverable on Upwork.

****Figure 2 here****

5. Sample and Randomization Balance

Of the 1,237 who completed Job 1, 877 filled out the survey.⁹ Of the 877 workers whose opinions on the issue of gender neutral bathrooms could be identified during the survey, 850 could be re-contacted for hire for Job 2 (the remaining 27 workers' profiles no longer appeared on Upwork one month after Job 1, when Job 2 was conducted). Of those 850 workers, 799 accepted the Upwork contract and were treated with condition messages. Of those, 786 completed the job and submitted the deliverable by the deadline. Only eight workers turned down the job after random assignment of conditions; two in the Company Agrees with Issue condition, four in the Company Disagrees with Issue Condition, and two in the Control

⁸ All workers received this message: “[person’s name]: I found your profile on Upwork and you look like a GREAT fit for a job I’m looking to fill. I need someone to translate just under 250 words of text from English to [non-English language], for payment of \$15. Please let me know if you’re interested. After you accept the job on Upwork, I’ll send you the text I’d like for you to translate.”

⁹ Workers completed the survey up until March 1. Workers who answered the survey from duplicate ipaddresses were dropped and are not included the sample.

condition.¹⁰ Table 2 presents summary statistics for the workers in the sample who completed the job and submitted the deliverable; by condition. Most of these characteristics were obtained from the worker's Upwork profiles. Gender was coded by an RA based on Upwork pictures and names. Opinion on Social-Political Issue Groupings were constructed based on the workers' survey responses about the issue of gender-neutral bathrooms. Table 2 reflects that there are no statistically significant differences in observable characteristics of workers between conditions, suggesting that randomization was successful and bias due to selection on observables was minimal. The last three rows of Table 2 reflect that random assignment within stratified employee opinion groups was implemented successfully.

Table 2 here

Workers in the sample are, on average, experienced Upworkers. At the time of the experiment they had earned close to \$2000 on Upwork, completed 14 prior Upwork jobs on average, and had worked about 350 hours on Upwork for hourly-rate jobs (this excludes hours spent on fixed-price jobs). Their prior Upwork ratings are high: 4.97/5.00 on average. They are about 60% male, and the majority have either a bachelor's or more advanced degree. Given the range of language translations used in the study, workers are also from a range of regions in the world: the highest proportion from Europe, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, the US and Canada, and other regions.

6. Measures

Dependent Variable. The primary dependent variable is *Number of Optional Words Translated*: the number of additional, unrequired, words that the worker completed. This continuous variable ranges from 0 (when no extra words were translated) to 2554 (the maximum number of optional words that could have been translated). The number of additional words translated was measured in English, as opposed to the translated language, for consistency across languages.

Though not pre-registered as a DV for this study as I did not expect there to be sufficient variation in required output quality, I also examine variation in, and differences across conditions of, *Quality of the Required Translation*. Translators fluent in each of the focal languages assessed the quality of the required translation on a scale of 1-5, with 1 being the worst quality translation and 5 the best quality translation. These assessments are somewhat subjective, but serve as a proxy for quality of required work.

Independent Variables. Three variables were constructed to indicate each of the randomly assigned conditions. *Company Agrees with Issue* is equal to 1 if the worker received information that the

¹⁰ Though beyond the scope of this paper, anecdotal evidence at this stage of the field experiment suggests that agreement and disagreement with a company's stance on a social-political issue is likely to influence workers' interest in a job and selection into a given job. For example, one of the workers who ended the contract after initially accepting it, explained "Sorry but I don't agree with your thought about gender bathrooms and I don't want to work for a company that is discriminating against a group of people." This paper examines a treatment effect of taking a stance on a social-political issue; future work can examine a selection effect of taking a stance on a social-political issue.

employer is in support of the gender neutral bathroom issue, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, the following are binary variables which correspond to the two other randomly assigned conditions (equal to 1 if the worker was assigned to that condition, and 0 otherwise): *Company Disagrees with Issue* and *Control*.

Moderators. To examine whether workers agreed or disagreed with the social-political stance treatments, I use workers' self-reported opinions about gender neutral bathrooms during the post-Job 1 survey. Workers who indicated that they "strongly agreed," "agreed", or "somewhat agreed" with the statement "I support gender neutral bathroom facilities, which are physically accessible and open to people of any gender" are assigned a 1 for *Employee Agrees with Issue*, and 0 otherwise. Workers who indicated that they "strongly disagreed," "disagreed," or "somewhat disagreed" with the statement are assigned a 1 for *Employee Disagrees with Issue*, and 0 otherwise. Workers who indicated that they "neither agreed nor disagreed" with the statement are assigned a 1 for *Employee Neutral about Issue* and 0 otherwise. See Table 2 for the summary statistics of these worker opinion buckets.

I also use a continuous variable, *Employee Agreement Scale*, which reflect the raw Likert response to the gender-neutral bathroom statement (1 indicates "strongly disagree" and 7 indicates "strongly agree").

Control Variables. I include in regression analyses control variables which may influence workers' willingness to complete extra work for their employer and work performance, namely gender, education, and Upwork experience. *Male* is a binary variable. This variable was assigned by an RA based on Upwork profile pictures and, when no picture was available, was based on worker names. *Bachelor's Degree*, *Master's Degree* and *PhD* are all binary variables indicating whether the worker included the specified degree on his or her Upwork profile. *Upwork Hourly Rate* is the worker's rate for hourly Upwork jobs (excluding fixed-price jobs). *Upwork Total Amount Earned* is the total amount earned by the worker on Upwork to date, in US dollars. *Number of Prior Upwork Jobs* is a continuous variable. *Upwork Average Assignment Rating* is a continuous variable measuring the worker's average rating on the Upwork platform, out of 5.

7. Results

7.1. Effect on Taking a Social-Political Stance on Extra Work Completed Unrequired for Payment

Figure 3 presents the kernel density estimations for *Number of Optional Words Translated* for the control and treatment groups.

*** Figure 3 here***

Figures 4a-4c show the mean number of optional words translated, by condition and by worker opinion on the social-political issue. Figure 4a reflects only those workers who disagree with the issue; Figure 4b those who agree with the issue; and Figure 4c those who are neutral about the issue. Figure 4a shows that, when workers are against the issue and the company takes a stance in favor of the issue, 117

optional words are translated, compared to 299 optional words translated when no stance is taken (the control) ($t(165)=-2.56$, $p=0.011$). When workers are against issue and the company takes a stance against the issue, 366 optional data points are completed; directionally higher but statistically equivalent to the 299 optional words translated when no stance is taken ($t(170)=0.64$, $p=0.519$).

Figure 4b shows that, when workers are for an issue and the company takes a stance in favor of the issue, there is a directionally but not statistically significant motivational effect compared to when no stance is taken (327 vs. 272 optional words translated, $t(207)=0.604$, $p=0.546$). When workers are for an issue and the company takes a stance against the issue, there is strong demotivational effect: only 103 optional words translated compared to 272 when no stance is taken ($t(210)=-2.848$, $p=0.005$).

Even if the observations from the second column in Figure 4a are combined with those from the first column in 4b to create a larger “company stance is in agreement with worker stance” bucket, the number of optional words completed by this group is still not statistically different from that of the combined (column 3 of Figure 4a and column 3 of Figure 4b) control (344 vs. 284, $t(379)=0.88$, $p=0.3768$). Combining the observations from the first column in Figure 4a with the second column in Figure 4b to generate a larger “company stance is in disagreement with worker stance” bucket, the difference in optional words completed by this group and the combined control is, as one would expect, highly statistically significant (109 vs. 284, $t(377)=-3.85$, $p=0.0001$).

Figure 4c reports the mean number of extra words translated amongst workers who are neutral about the social-political issue, by condition, and as such serves as a placebo test. One would expect that individuals who are neutral about (neither agree nor disagree with) the issue of gender-neutral bathrooms would complete a statistically equivalent amount of extra work regardless of whether their company is for the issue, against the issue, or does not indicate a stance on the issue. Workers who were neutral about the issue and received no information about their employer’s stance (the control condition) translated 358 optional words on average. This is indeed statistically equivalent to the number of optional words translated by workers who were neutral about the issue and received information that their employer was against the issue (297, $t(142)=-0.561$, $p=0.576$) or who were neutral about the issue and received information that their employer was for the issue (348, $t(134)=-0.084$, $p=0.933$).

*** Figures 4a-4c here***

Table 3 reports OLS regression results which indicate that these relationships are robust to the inclusion of control variables. Models 1, 3, and 5 mirror the information presented in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c respectively, while Models 2, 4 and 6 add as controls covariates likely to influence extra work completed: gender, education, and measures of Upwork experience. These regression results show that the demotivating effect of taking a stance with which employees disagree (either for or against the issue) persist with the inclusion of control variables. Likewise, the addition of control variables does not change the lack

of motivational effect on employees when taking a stance with which employees agree (either for or against the issue). Examination of control variable coefficients suggests that that men were on average less likely to complete extra work unrequired for payment than women, consistent with extant literature (Organ and Ryan 1995).

Table 3 here

Up until now I have been considering employee stance on the issue bucketed into one of three groupings: agree with, disagree with, or neutral about the issue. Table 4 reports OLS regressions results which reflect how company stance treatment interacts with employee opinion on the social-political issue measured as a continuous variable (the 1-7 Likert scale where 1 indicates strongly disagree and 7 indicates strongly agree). These results are consistent with what we have seen so far. As we would expect, the coefficient on the interaction of Company Stance Agrees with Issue x C. Employee Agreement Scale is positive (though only marginally significant with the inclusion of controls); the effect of the company taking a stance in agreement with the issue compared to the not taking a stance increases as employee agreement with the issue increases ($B= 49.34, p=0.044$ without controls, $B= 42.66, p=0.087$ with controls). Likewise, the coefficient on the interaction of Company Stance Disagrees with Issue x C. Employee Agreement Scale is negative; the effect of taking a stance against the issue compared to not taking a stance decreases as employee agreement with the issue increases ($B= -41.24, p=0.090$ without controls, $B= -50.84, p=0.045$ with controls).

Table 4 here

7.2. Effect of Taking Social-Political Stance on Quality of Required Work Completed

Figure 5 shows the distribution of quality scores on the required translation during Job 2, by condition. I had not originally intended to look at the effect of communicating a social-political stance on required work as I had not expected there to be sufficient variation in required work quality. As Figure 5 shows, however, there was indeed variation based on independent assessments of the translation quality.

Insert Figure 5 here

I thus explore variation in mean required translation quality by condition and employee agreement with the issue, reported in Table 5. These effects are generally consistent with those reported on amount of extra work completed, though the negative effect of taking a stance with which employees disagree is less pronounced. When workers are for the issue and their employer takes a stance for the issue, they submit work of equal quality as when no employer stance is taken (3.95 vs. 3.94, $t(206)=0.08, p=0.935$). When workers are for the issue and their employer takes a stance against the issue, they provide a directionally, but not statistically significant at the five percent cutoff, lower quality of output (3.68 vs. 3.94, $t(209)=-1.85, p=0.0664$). When workers are against the issue and the company takes a stance in favor of the issue,

quality of required work is lower than when workers are against the issue and no stance is taken (3.58 vs. 3.94, $t(165)=-2.16$, $p=0.032$). When workers are against issue and the company takes a stance against the issue, quality is practically and statistically equivalent to when no stance is taken (3.94 vs 3.94 $t(170)=0.01$, $p=0.993$). There is no effect of taking a stance on the issue, in either direction, if the worker is neutral about the issue, as one would expect (4.00 vs 4.06, $t(142)=-0.40$, $p=0.686$; 4.17 vs. 4.06, $t(134)=0.801$, $p=0.424$).

Table 5 here

Even if the observations in Column 1 are combined with those of Column 5 into a larger “company stance is in agreement with worker stance” bucket, the number of optional words completed by this group is still not statistically different from that of the combined (Columns 3 and 6) control (3.95 vs. 3.94, $t(378)=0.06$, $p=0.9478$). Combining the observations from Column 4 and Column 2 to generate a larger “company stance is in disagreement with worker stance” bucket, the difference in optional words completed by this group and the combined (Columns 3 and 6) control is, as one would expect, highly statistically significant (3.64 vs. 3.94, $t(376)=-2.82$, $p=0.0050$).

OLS regression results reported in Table 6 indicate that these comparisons are generally robust to the inclusion of control variables. The addition of control variables results in a decrease in statistical significance of the demotivating effect on quality of work completed of taking a stance in favor of an issue when employees disagree with the issue ($B= -0.36$, $p=0.032$ without controls, $B= -0.31$, $p=0.067$ with controls), but an increase in statistical significance of the demotivating effect of taking a stance against an issue when employees agree with the issue ($B= -0.26$, $p=0.065$ without controls, $B= -0.35$, $p=0.019$ with controls). The effect of taking a stance that is congruent with that of the employee, either for or against the issue, remains statistically equivalent to not taking a stance (the control group) with the inclusion of control variables, as does the effect of taking a stance on an issue when employees are indifferent about the issue.

Table 6 here

Table 7 reports OLS regression results of the effect of communicating a social-political stance on required work quality interacted with employee agreement with the issue measured on a continuous scale. The coefficient on the interaction of Company Stance Agrees with Issue x C. Employee Agreement Scale is directionally positive (close to, but not statistically significant at a 10% cutoff); the effect of the company taking a stance in agreement with the issue compared to the not taking a stance increases as employee agreement with the issue increases ($B= 0.30$ $p=0.161$ without controls, $B= 0.36$, $p=0.103$ with controls). The coefficient on the interaction of Company Stance Disagrees with Issue x. C. Employee Agreement Scale is negative, as we would expect; the effect of taking a stance against the issue compared to not taking a stance decreases as employee agreement with the issue increases ($B= -0.10$, $p=0.036$ without controls, $B= -0.12$, $p=0.012$ with controls).

Table 7 here

Exploratory analysis of this additional dependent variable – quality of required translation – provides additional support that there is a demotivating effect when employers take a stance on an issue with which workers disagree, but no motivating effect when employers take a stance on an issue with which workers agree. There was no statistically significant effect on taking a stance on a social-political issue on the quality of *extra* work completed. Conditional on doing extra work, this extra work was of equivalent quality by condition (see Appendix Table 1 for means comparisons; these effects do not become stronger with the inclusion of control variables in OLS regressions, as shown in Appendix Table 2). An examination of the effect of taking a social-political stance on whether *any* (as opposed to how much) extra work is completed is directionally consistent with the effect on quantity of extra work completed, but is not statistically significant at the 5% cutoff (see Appendix Table 3 for logit regression results).

The demotivating effect of taking a social-political stance with which employees disagree (on either side of the social-political issue) thus manifests itself both in a *decrease in quality of required work* completed, as well as in a *decrease in the quantity of extra work completed* for the employer.

7.3. Discussion of Asymmetry in Effects on Worker Motivation

These results show an asymmetric effect of an employer’s social-political stance on motivation: when the worker disagrees with the stance, there is a demotivating effect, yet when the worker agrees with the stance, there is no (statistically significant) motivating effect. This asymmetric effect is initially puzzling given the conjecture that perceptions of value-(in)congruence with one’s employer should be positively (negatively) associated with work effort.

The asymmetry in effects in a work context can likely be explained by a false consensus effect (Marks and Miller 1987) in workers’ perceptions about others’ stances on social-political issues. There is strong evidence that individuals tend to perceive a “false consensus” with regard to the relative commonness of their own opinions and overestimate the degree to which others share their beliefs (see Marks and Miller 1987 for a review), including in subordinate-manager and work contexts (Martinko and Gardner 1987; Mowday 1981). This overestimation of the degree to which others share one’s beliefs applies to social-political issue domains including LGBTQ issues, legalization of drugs, gun regulation, death penalty, climate change, and women’s issues (Bauman and Geher 2002, Wojcieszak and Price 2009, Leviston, Walker and Morwinski 2013). The desire for opinion reinforcement about social-political issues in particular (Garrett 2009) results in selective exposure to others who share (Sherman et al. 1983) and to news that confirms (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2009, Messing and Westwood 2014) one’s own judgements about social-political issues. This furthermore exacerbates the tendency for individuals to perceive their stance on social-political issues as reinforced and common, rather than challenged. In the

context of political protests, Cantoni et al. (2017) find that *updating* one's beliefs about the political protest turnout of others influences one's own reported political protest participation, whether that updating is positive or negative. In this paper's context, if workers already expect their colleagues and employers to share their views due to a false consensus effect, no updating takes place when it is revealed that the employer shares their perspective.

Indeed, it has been shown that individuals allocate greater attentional resources and react more strongly to information or events that are surprising or negative (Skowronski and Carlston 1989, Wong and Weiner 1981), including in work contexts (Brockner et al. 1990). Given the false consensus effect, information that one's employer disagrees with one's own social-political stance on an issue is both surprising, as well as negative, whereas information that one's employer agrees with one's own social-political stance on an issue is neither surprising nor negative. It follows that attentional resources dedicated to, and strength of reaction to, the former be greater than the latter.

8. Conclusions

The importance of human capital to organizational success has been well-established (Campbell et al. 2012a, 2012b, Coff 1997, Foss and Lindenberg 2013, Huselid et al. 1997, Koch and McGrath 1996, Rider and Tan 2015). This paper shows that communicating a social-political stance on an issue influences employee motivation, and that this varies notably by whether the employee agrees or disagrees with the stance. I find evidence that communicating a social-political stance with which employees disagree has a demotivating effect, but that communicating a social-political stance with which employees agree has no motivating effect. This effect holds whether the stance communicated is for or against the social-political issue.

As the first paper, to my knowledge, to consider the strategic implications of the burgeoning phenomenon of corporate activism on a critical internal stakeholder – the employee – this paper contributes to the nascent scholarship on the strategic implications of CEOs and corporations taking stands on social-political issues outside the realm of their core businesses (Chatterji and Toffel 2016, 2017, Dodd and Supa 2014). The results of this paper highlight the risks of being unaware of employees' social-political values if a company chooses to take a stance on a social-political issue. This is in line with, and contributes causal field evidence to, research that has to date mainly used lab and survey evidence to demonstrate the importance of value congruence between employees and the firm more broadly (e.g., Cable and Edwards 2004, Edwards and Cable 2009, Goodman and Svyantek 1999, Cable and DeRue 2002, Hoffman and Woehr 2006, Kristof-Brown et al. 2005, Meglino et al. 1991). This paper suggests that *social-political* value congruence is be an important type of “value” in person-organization fit as well, complementing McDonnell and Cobb (2019), which provides evidence of a relationship between director exit and social activist

boycotts among directors who are ideologically aligned with the activists. Future work can explore the extent to which an employer's social-political values influence perceptions of an organization's identity (Hsu and Hannan 2005) amongst other external constituents (Hsu and Elsbach 2013).

As with any field experiment in a given setting, it is important to note potential limitations of the generalizability of the results to other settings. This paper examined the effect of an employer taking a stance on a social-political issue on employees' motivation while completing a short-term job for a small amount of pay in a setting more typical of "gig" employment than a longer-term, traditional relationship. Attributes of the Upwork setting make it extremely valuable as one in which to study the effect of communicating a social-political stance on worker motivation. To establish a causal effect of a firm's social-political stance on worker motivation, one needs to hold constant the many endogenous factors that could influence both a firm's social-political stance and worker motivation. Yet randomly assigning a company's social-political stance across workers is a feat that is extremely challenging to successfully administer in the setting of a traditional employee-employer relationship where information is available from numerous sources and treatment-effect diffusion from treatment to control groups is likely. In an online spot market work setting, on the other hand, the researcher can randomly assign information about the employer, keeping all other potentially confounding factors that could influence worker behavior constant. Furthermore, workers complete their work online and without interacting with each other, which reduces the likelihood of treatment-effect diffusion from the treatment groups to the control group. The use of this research setting thus avoids many of the internal validity challenges that would afflict similarly designed field experiments implemented "in-house" with a traditional company (Burbano 2016).

Additionally, "gig worker" settings are becoming increasingly relevant for strategy and management scholars in their own right (Burtch et al. 2018). The growth of online markets for contract labor has been rising at a fast pace.¹¹ A 2016 Deloitte study indicated that 42 percent of executives anticipate an increase in the use of contingent workers in the next three to five years. A 2013 Accenture study predicted that future competitive advantage will hinge on "workers who aren't employees at all." Furthermore, it's not just entrepreneurial organizations that are leveraging online labor market platforms as sources of human capital: between 2016 and 2017, there has been over a 25 percent increase in the number of projects sourced via these platforms by Fortune 500 companies.¹² As there are few studies examining how employer-level characteristics influence the motivation of these non-traditional workers (Martins et al.

¹¹ Workers in this market earned about \$700 million by 2009, and the Financial Times estimated this market to be worth \$1 billion annually by the end of 2012 (Horton et al. 2013). The number of employers billing on ODesk (since rebranded as Upwork) increased 800% between 2009 and 2013, and the number of working contractors per quarter increased by approximately 1,000% over the same period.

¹² Platform Sourcing: How Fortune 500 Firms are Adopting Online Freelancing Platforms, Oxford Internet Institute 2017, available at <https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/publications/platform-sourcing.pdf>

2004), this paper demonstrates that an employer taking a political stand on a social-political issue can influence the motivation and productivity of these workers.

As the first paper, to my knowledge, to examine the effect of communicating a social-political stance on the behavior of an important stakeholder, the employee, and doing so in a manner that sheds light of a causal effect on revealed (rather than stated) preferences or behavior, this paper represents an important first step in understanding the implications of communicating such stances on human capital. Future work that examines whether similar effects hold for jobs that are longer term in nature and in-house will be important complements to this research. Additionally, I examined the effect of an employer taking a stand on one social-political issue in this paper: gender-neutral bathrooms. Future work could explore how effects vary for different types of social-political stances.

As this paper examines a *treatment* effect of taking a social-political stance on employee motivation, future work can explore a *selection* effect on the types of workers that self-select into firms of different types, which could include firms of different social-political values. The treatment effect explored in this paper is perhaps most relevant to a firm which had previously been neutral (or silent) on social-political issues making its stance public. It could also be relevant to a change in leadership or ownership (due to a management change, merger, or alliance), resulting in a treatment effect of a social-political stance on a firm's employees.

From a practical perspective, this paper suggests that managers should be aware of their employees' stances on a given political or social issue prior to taking a public political stance on the issue and should think twice about taking a stance that is incongruent with that of their employees.

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Figures and Tables

Fig. 1: Field Experimental Design Flow




Fig. 2: Messages, per Condition

| Treatment Groups | | Control Group |
|--|---|--|
| <i>Employer Supports Gender Neutral Bathrooms</i> | <i>Employer Is Against Gender Neutral Bathrooms</i> | <i>Control Group (No Employer Stance on Issue)</i> |
| <p>Attached is the document we need you to translate from English to {Language}. You're ONLY REQUIRED to translate the FIRST page of this document (the Executive Overview, just under 250 words), but it would be really HELPFUL for us if you'd be willing to do more. We'd appreciate any additional sentences or paragraphs translated beyond the required first page, which would help us at {The Company} serve our clients more effectively. This isn't necessary to be paid in full for the job and won't influence your feedback rating / likelihood of being hired again.</p> <p>Also, though not directly relevant for your work with us, we wanted to let you know that we at {The Company} will be releasing a statement...</p> | | |
| ...IN SUPPORT OF... | ...AGAINST... | <p>...about a SLIGHT change to our company name in the near future. We have decided to add the ending "INCORPORATED" to our company name. This change will be reflected on our logo and all of our communications going forward. We will make this name change officially within the next one to three months.</p> |
| ...the view that every person should be permitted to use the bathroom consistent with their gender identity, regardless of their gender assigned at birth. We believe that companies, schools, and public institutions should... | | |
| ...BE REQUIRED... | ...NOT BE REQUIRED... | |
| ...to provide gender inclusive bathrooms and think that it's important that we take a stand on issues like these. | | |
| <p>Please send us your final product in a .doc file within week from today. If you need a time extension on the deadline, let us know.</p> <p>{Name} & {The Company} Team</p> | | |

Fig. 3: Kernel Densities of Number of Optional Words Translated, by Condition




Fig. 4a: Optional Words Translated Amongst Workers Who Disagree with Issue, by Condition




Fig. 4b: Optional Words Translated Amongst Workers Who Agree with Issue, by Condition




Fig. 4c: Optional Words Translated Amongst Workers Who are Neutral about Issue, by Condition




Fig. 5: Distribution of Required Translation Quality (1-5), by Condition




Table 1: Workers' Distribution of Opinions on Different Social-Political Issues

| | Mean Opinion (out of 7-Pt Likert Scale) | Standard Deviation | N who Strongly Disagree | N who Disagree | N who Somewhat Disagree | N who Neither Agree Nor Disagree | N who Somewhat Agree | N who Agree | N who Strongly Agree | Total N |
|---|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|---|----------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|---------|
| "Owning a gun is an essential part of American freedom." | 2.72 | 1.63 | 282 | 177 | 107 | 202 | 51 | 34 | 23 | 876 |
| "Transgender individuals should be allowed to serve in the US military." | 5.11 | 1.56 | 24 | 40 | 27 | 263 | 87 | 242 | 194 | 877 |
| "The United States should build a wall to prevent illegal immigrants entering." | 2.68 | 1.66 | 300 | 191 | 67 | 207 | 47 | 42 | 21 | 875 |
| "Recreational marijuana should be legal." | 4.07 | 1.80 | 98 | 109 | 77 | 243 | 126 | 139 | 83 | 875 |
| "Confederate monuments celebrate white supremacy and should be taken down." | 4.11 | 1.37 | 34 | 82 | 59 | 483 | 70 | 87 | 59 | 874 |
| "I am in support of DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), which protects eligible immigrant youth who came to the United States when they were children from deportation." | 5.31 | 1.32 | 7 | 12 | 21 | 271 | 111 | 262 | 192 | 876 |
| "Safe and legal abortion is a woman's human right." | 5.36 | 1.76 | 45 | 39 | 42 | 132 | 99 | 209 | 307 | 873 |
| "There should be stricter regulations on gun ownership." | 6.05 | 1.28 | 13 | 8 | 11 | 91 | 81 | 235 | 435 | 874 |
| "Employers should be required to pay women and men the same salary for the same job." | 6.35 | 1.10 | 8 | 7 | 12 | 40 | 52 | 217 | 538 | 874 |
| "The media is a trustworthy source of news and current events." | 6.35 | 1.10 | 93 | 174 | 219 | 175 | 126 | 65 | 21 | 873 |
| "I support same sex marriage." | 5.04 | 0.19 | 77 | 49 | 31 | 175 | 69 | 216 | 258 | 875 |
| "Businesses should be required to have women on their board of directors." | 5.04 | 1.92 | 30 | 47 | 38 | 234 | 126 | 215 | 186 | 876 |
| "Muslim immigrants should be banned from entering the country until the government improves its ability to screen out potential terrorists." | 3.04 | 1.62 | 200 | 180 | 114 | 237 | 79 | 40 | 26 | 876 |
| "The government should classify Bitcoin as a legal currency." | 4.03 | 1.35 | 37 | 93 | 74 | 438 | 106 | 86 | 40 | 874 |
| "The US should not accept refugees from Syria." | 2.30 | 1.43 | 227 | 222 | 86 | 278 | 33 | 20 | 9 | 875 |
| "Police officers should be required to wear body cameras." | 5.18 | 1.44 | 12 | 40 | 30 | 207 | 165 | 241 | 178 | 873 |
| "I believe that immigrants make up an important part of, and contribute to, society." | 5.76 | 1.12 | 3 | 5 | 11 | 120 | 156 | 323 | 256 | 874 |
| "Climate change is a pressing issue, and it is critical that we slow down and mitigate the effects of climate change." | 6.10 | 1.15 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 87 | 98 | 236 | 436 | 876 |
| "I support the National Rifle Association." | 3.23 | 1.49 | 175 | 126 | 49 | 441 | 23 | 49 | 11 | 874 |
| "I support LGBT issues, and think that they are important." | 5.09 | 1.61 | 37 | 26 | 29 | 268 | 99 | 199 | 216 | 874 |
| "The United States should continue its use of drone strikes overseas." | 3.18 | 1.46 | 158 | 153 | 97 | 373 | 46 | 32 | 16 | 875 |
| "I support gender neutral bathroom facilities, which are physically accessible and open to people of any gender." | 4.20 | 1.83 | 86 | 109 | 81 | 235 | 108 | 150 | 108 | 877 |

Table 2: Worker Characteristics, by Condition (Randomization Balance)

| | Control | Employer Agrees with Issue | Employer Disagrees with Issue |
|---|---------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <i>Worker Characteristics</i> | | | |
| Total Earned (US Dollars) | 1626.37 | 1771.72 (8264.58) [0.82] | 1761.24 (8079.65) [0.83] |
| Number of Upwork Jobs Completed | 11.32 | 13.33 (40.06) [0.50] | 17.29 (56.00) [0.12] |
| Hourly Rate (US Dollars) | 14.95 | 14.54 (8.07) [0.58] | 15.79 (16.89) [0.48] |
| Average Upwork Rating for Prior Jobs (out of 5) | 4.97 | 4.97 (0.08) [0.57] | 4.97 (0.16) [0.87] |
| Male (Y=1, N=0) | 0.62 | 0.59 (0.49) [0.44] | 0.56 (0.50) [0.17] |
| Has Bachelor's Degree (Y=1, N=0) | 0.41 | 0.43 (0.50) [0.65] | 0.42 (0.49) [0.84] |
| Has Master's Degree (Y=1, N=0) | 0.21 | 0.18 (0.38) [0.27] | 0.25 (0.43) [0.31] |
| Has PhD (Y=1, N=0) | 0.02 | 0.02 (0.15) [0.97] | 0.02 (0.14) [0.72] |
| From the US or Canada (Y=1, N=0) | 0.12 | 0.16 (0.36) [0.20] | 0.14 (0.35) [0.44] |
| From Europe (Y=1, N=0) | 0.45 | 0.40 (0.49) [0.17] | 0.40 (0.49) [0.21] |
| From Asia (Y=1, N=0) | 0.14 | 0.19 (0.39) [0.18] | 0.17 (0.38) [0.36] |
| From Latin America or the Caribbean | 0.17 | 0.16 (0.37) [0.84] | 0.19 (0.39) [0.61] |
| From Other Regions | 0.12 | 0.10 (0.30) [0.56] | 0.10 (0.30) [0.59] |
| <i>Opinion on Socio-Political Issue Groupings</i> | | | |
| Worker Agrees with Issue (Somewhat Agrees, Agrees, or Strongly Agrees with Gender Neutral Bathroom Statement) | 0.33 | 0.32 (0.47) [0.90] | 0.32 (0.47) [0.96] |
| Worker Neutral about Issue (Neither Agrees Nor Disagrees with Gender Neutral Bathroom Statement) | 0.27 | 0.26 (0.44) [0.85] | 0.27 (0.45) [0.86] |
| Worker Disagrees with Issue (Somewhat Disagrees, Disagrees, or Strongly Disagrees with Gender Neutral Bathroom Statement) | 0.41 | 0.42 (0.49) [0.77] | 0.40 (0.49) [0.91] |

Standard deviation reported in parentheses. P-value of the null that the difference of means between the treatment and control group equals 0 is reported in brackets. Based on independent sample t-tests.

Table 3: OLS Regression Results of Effect of Company Stance on Number of Optional Words Translated, within Employee Stance Subgroups

| <i>Employee Stance on Issue:</i> | Employee Disagrees | | Employee Agrees | | Employee Neutral | |
|-------------------------------------|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
| Company Stance Agrees with Issue | -182.06*** (69.94) <i>p</i> =0.010 | -157.24** (68.07) <i>p</i> =0.022 | 54.72 (90.31) <i>p</i> =0.545 | 45.43 (99.35) <i>p</i> =0.648 | -10.19 (121.12) <i>p</i> =0.933 | -67.93 (127.55) <i>p</i> =0.595 |
| Company Stance Disagrees with Issue | 66.57 (102.71) <i>p</i> =0.517 | 79.29 (105.45) <i>p</i> =0.453 | -169.43*** (60.99) <i>p</i> =0.006 | -192.02*** (70.78) <i>p</i> =0.007 | -61.81 (110.36) <i>p</i> =0.576 | -88.99 (127.84) <i>p</i> =0.487 |
| Male | | -145.33** (68.38) <i>p</i> =0.035 | | -134.47* (79.74) <i>p</i> =0.093 | | -180.52 (110.12) <i>p</i> =0.103 |
| Bachelors Degree | | 20.32 (78.57) <i>p</i> =0.796 | | 60.37 (69.31) <i>p</i> =0.385 | | 94.44 (108.75) <i>p</i> =0.386 |
| Masters Degree | | -49.72 (83.02) <i>p</i> =0.550 | | -23.98 (70.47) <i>p</i> =0.734 | | -89.29 (104.52) <i>p</i> =0.394 |
| PhD | | -23.28 (93.14) <i>p</i> =0.803 | | -183.28** (87.91) <i>p</i> =0.038 | | -116.12 (123.36) <i>p</i> =0.348 |
| Upwork Hourly Rate | | -0.2 (5.91) <i>p</i> =0.973 | | 2.44 (5.19) <i>p</i> =0.639 | | -2.4 (1.75) <i>p</i> =0.172 |
| Total Earned on Upwork | | 0.00 (0.01) <i>p</i> =0.712 | | 0.00 (0.01) <i>p</i> =0.436 | | -0.01 (0.01) <i>p</i> =0.469 |
| Number Upwork Jobs | | -0.47 (0.81) <i>p</i> =0.561 | | -1.69* (0.91) <i>p</i> =0.066 | | 1.26 (3.18) <i>p</i> =0.692 |
| Average Prior Upwork Rating | | 203.66 (196.13) <i>p</i> =0.300 | | -359.17 (444.06) <i>p</i> =0.419 | | 511.61* (269.42) <i>p</i> =0.059 |
| Constant | 299.22*** (67.34) <i>p</i> =0.000 | -652.54 (1010.42) <i>p</i> =0.519 | 272.62*** (59.17) <i>p</i> =0.000 | 2130.00 (2218.09) <i>p</i> =0.338 | 358.79*** (80.8) <i>p</i> =0.000 | -2032.33 (1357.34) <i>p</i> =0.136 |
| N | 254 | 239 | 318 | 296 | 210 | 195 |
| R-Squared | 0.034 | 0.054 | 0.031 | 0.061 | 0.002 | 0.039 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * *p*<.10, ** *p*<.05, *** *p*<.01.

Table 4: OLS Regression Results of Effect of Company Stance on Number of Optional Words Translated, Moderated by Employee Agreement with the Issue

| | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|--|--|
| Company Stance Agrees with Issue | -245.65** (104.51) <i>p</i> =0.019 | -227.27** (103.34) <i>p</i> =0.028 |
| Company Stance Disagrees with Issue | 109.2 (127.07) <i>p</i> =0.390 | 140.76 (129.86) <i>p</i> =0.279 |
| C. Employee Agreement Scale | -10.81 (19.00) <i>p</i> =0.570 | 3.59 (19.41) <i>p</i> =0.853 |
| (Company Stance Agrees with Issue) x (C. Employee Agreement Scale) | 49.34** (24.42) <i>p</i> =0.044 | 42.66* (24.88) <i>p</i> =0.087 |
| (Company Stance Disagrees with Issue) x (C. Employee Agreement Scale) | -41.24* (24.29) <i>p</i> =0.090 | -50.84** (25.29) <i>p</i> =0.045 |
| Male | | -151.83*** (48.67) <i>p</i> =0.002 |
| Bachelor's Degree | | 63.26 (46.33) <i>p</i> =0.173 |
| Master's Degree | | -57.68 (46.2) <i>p</i> =0.212 |
| PhD | | -91.47* (50.8) <i>p</i> =0.072 |
| Upwork Hourly Rate | | -1.04 (1.63) <i>p</i> =0.525 |
| Upwork Total Amount Earned | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.717 |
| Number of Prior Upwork Jobs | | -0.75 (0.61) <i>p</i> =0.221 |
| Upwork Average Assignment Rating | | -7.55 (222.64) <i>p</i> =0.973 |
| Constant | 348.96*** 89.71 <i>p</i> =0.000 | 435.40 1120.8 <i>p</i> =0.698 |
| R-Squared | 0.016 | 0.038 |
| N | 782 | 730 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * *p*<.10, ** *p*<.05, *** *p*<.01

Table 5: Mean Quality of Required Translation Document (out of 5), by Condition and Employee Stance on Issue

| | When Employee Agrees with Issue | | | When Employee Disagrees with Issue | | | When Employee Neutral About Issue | | |
|---|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| | Company Agrees with Issue (1) | Company Disagrees with Issue (2) | Company Does Not Take Stance on Issue (Control) (3) | Company Agrees with Issue (4) | Company Disagrees with Issue (5) | Company Does Not Take Stance on Issue (Control) (6) | Company Agrees with Issue (7) | Company Disagrees with Issue (8) | Company Does Not Take Stance on Issue (Control) (9) |
| Mean: | 3.95 | 3.68 | 3.94 | 3.58 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 4.17 | 4.00 | 4.06 |
| Standard Deviation: | (0.95) | (1.08) | (1.04) | (1.09) | (0.92) | (1.04) | (0.95) | (0.88) | (0.81) |
| Difference of Means between Treatment and Control is 0*: | $p=0.935$ | $p=0.066$ | | $p=0.032$ | $p=0.993$ | | $p=0.424$ | $p=0.686$ | |
| N: | 105 | 108 | 103 | 82 | 87 | 85 | 66 | 74 | 70 |

*Based on independent sample t-tests.

Table 6: OLS Regression Results of Effect of Company Stance on Number of Optional Words Translated, within Employee Stance Subgroups

| <i>Employee Stance on Issue:</i> | Employee Disagrees | | Employee Agrees | | Employee Neutral | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
| Company Stance Agrees with Issue | -0.36** (0.16) <i>p</i> =0.032 | -0.31* (0.17) <i>p</i> =0.067 | 0.01 (0.13) <i>p</i> =0.935 | -0.02 (0.14) <i>p</i> =0.865 | 0.11 (0.14) <i>p</i> =0.423 | 0.11 (0.14) <i>p</i> =0.424 |
| Company Stance Disagrees with Issue | 0.00 (0.15) <i>p</i> =0.993 | 0.01 (0.16) <i>p</i> =0.944 | -0.26* (0.14) <i>p</i> =0.065 | -0.35** (0.15) <i>p</i> =0.019 | -0.06 (0.14) <i>p</i> =0.685 | -0.02 (0.15) <i>p</i> =0.868 |
| Male | | 0.16 (0.13) <i>p</i> =0.225 | | -0.15 (0.12) <i>p</i> =0.218 | | -0.22* (0.12) <i>p</i> =0.059 |
| Bachelors Degree | | 0.00 (0.14) <i>p</i> =0.993 | | 0.11 (0.12) <i>p</i> =0.341 | | 0.27** (0.11) <i>p</i> =0.021 |
| Masters Degree | | 0.1 (0.15) <i>p</i> =0.502 | | -0.02 (0.15) <i>p</i> =0.909 | | 0.00 (0.16) <i>p</i> =0.987 |
| PhD | | 0.29 (0.38) <i>p</i> =0.455 | | 0.2 (0.37) <i>p</i> =0.600 | | 0.66** (0.29) <i>p</i> =0.021 |
| Upwork Hourly Rate | | 0.00 (0.01) <i>p</i> =0.727 | | 0.01 (0.01) <i>p</i> =0.376 | | -0.01*** (0) <i>p</i> =0.000 |
| Total Earned on Upwork | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.350 | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.512 | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.390 |
| Number Upwork Jobs | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.104 | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.512 | | -0.01 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.114 |
| Average Prior Upwork Rating | | 0.28 (0.47) <i>p</i> =0.547 | | 0.53 (0.37) <i>p</i> =0.158 | | 0.1 (0.4) <i>p</i> =0.801 |
| Constant | 3.94*** (0.11) <i>p</i> =0.00 | 2.38 (2.37) <i>p</i> =0.317 | 3.94*** (0.09) <i>p</i> =0.000 | 1.31 (1.84) <i>p</i> =0.477 | 4.06*** (0.1) <i>p</i> =0.000 | 3.73* (1.97) <i>p</i> =0.059 |
| N | 254 | 239 | 316 | 294 | 210 | 195 |
| R-Squared | 0.026 | 0.047 | 0.016 | 0.042 | 0.007 | 0.106 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * *p*<.10, ** *p*<.05, *** *p*<.01.

Table 7: OLS Regression Results of Effect of Company Stance on Number of Optional Words Translated, Moderated by Employee Opinion about the Issue

| | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Company Stance Agrees with Issue | -0.43* (0.24) <i>p</i> =0.073 | -0.40 (0.25) <i>p</i> =0.103 |
| Company Stance Disagrees with Issue | 0.01 (0.04) <i>p</i> =0.870 | 0.02 (0.04) <i>p</i> =0.596 |
| C. Employee Agreement Scale | 0.08 (0.05) <i>p</i> =0.116 | 0.07 (0.05) <i>p</i> =0.178 |
| (Company Stance Agrees with Issue) x (C. Employee Agreement Scale) | 0.30 (0.21) <i>p</i> =0.161 | 0.36 (0.22) <i>p</i> =0.103 |
| (Company Stance Disagrees with Issue) x (C. Employee Agreement Scale) | -0.10** (0.05) <i>p</i> =0.036 | -0.12** (0.05) <i>p</i> =0.012 |
| Male | | -0.06 (0.07) <i>p</i> =0.442 |
| Bachelor's Degree | | 0.16** (0.07) <i>p</i> =0.031 |
| Master's Degree | | -0.03 (0.09) <i>p</i> =0.760 |
| PhD | | 0.36 (0.23) <i>p</i> =0.110 |
| Upwork Hourly Rate | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.378 |
| Upwork Total Amount Earned | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.513 |
| Number of Prior Upwork Jobs | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.385 |
| Upwork Average Assignment Rating | | 0.41 (0.28) <i>p</i> =0.147 |
| Constant | 3.95*** (0.16) <i>p</i> =0.00 | 1.88 (1.42) <i>p</i> =0.185 |
| R-Squared | 780 | 728 |
| N | 0.023 | 0.039 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * *p*<.10, ** *p*<.05, *** *p*<.01.

APPENDIX

Appendix T1: Mean Quality of Optional Translations (out of 5), by Condition and Employee Stance on Issue

| | When Employee Agrees with Issue | | | When Employee Disagrees with Issue | | | When Employee Neutral About Issue | | |
|---|--|---|--|--|---|--|--|---|--|
| | Company Agrees with Issue (1) | Company Disagrees with Issue (2) | Company Does Not Take Stance on Issue (Control) (3) | Company Agrees with Issue (4) | Company Disagrees with Issue (5) | Company Does Not Take Stance on Issue (Control) (6) | Company Agrees with Issue (7) | Company Disagrees with Issue (8) | Company Does Not Take Stance on Issue (Control) (9) |
| Mean: | 4.09 | 4.09 | 4.22 | 3.91 | 4.12 | 3.91 | 4.32 | 3.97 | 4.06 |
| Standard Deviation: | (0.98) | (0.91) | (1.01) | (0.98) | (1.01) | (.92) | (0.75) | (0.81) | (0.81) |
| Difference of Means between Treatment and Control is 0*: | <i>p</i> = 0.487 | <i>p</i> = 0.505 | | <i>p</i> = 0.229 | <i>p</i> = 0.809 | | <i>p</i> = 0.447 | <i>p</i> = 0.333 | |
| N: | 56 | 49 | 49 | 35 | 49 | 47 | 31 | 36 | 42 |

*Based on independent sample t-tests.

Appendix T2: OLS Regression Results of Effect of Company Stance on Quality of Optional Translations (Out of 5), within Employee Stance Subgroups

| <i>Employee Stance on Issue:</i> | Employee Disagrees | | Employee Agrees | | Employee Neutral | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
| Company Stance Agrees with Issue | -0.26 (0.21) <i>p</i> =0.231 | -0.29 (0.22) <i>p</i> =0.181 | -0.14 (0.19) <i>p</i> =0.488 | -0.13 (0.21) <i>p</i> =0.524 | 0.16 (0.20) <i>p</i> =0.431 | 0.23 (0.22) <i>p</i> =0.293 |
| Company Stance Disagrees with Issue | -0.05 (0.20) <i>p</i> =0.809 | -0.14 (0.21) <i>p</i> =0.509 | -0.13 (0.20) <i>p</i> =0.502 | -0.04 (0.22) <i>p</i> =0.871 | -0.19 (0.20) <i>p</i> =0.328 | -0.09 (0.23) <i>p</i> =0.7000 |
| Male | | 0.02 (0.18) <i>p</i> =0.897 | | -0.03 (0.18) <i>p</i> =0.869 | | -0.26 (0.18) <i>p</i> =0.150 |
| Bachelors Degree | | 0.27 (0.17) <i>p</i> =0.117 | | 0.01 (0.17) <i>p</i> =0.932 | | 0.13** (0.19) <i>p</i> =0.506 |
| Masters Degree | | 0.22 (0.21) <i>p</i> =0.306 | | -0.22 (0.20) <i>p</i> =0.256 | | 0.13 (0.28) <i>p</i> =0.634 |
| PhD | | 0.23 (0.45) <i>p</i> =0.621 | | 0.536 (0.37) <i>p</i> =0.153 | | 0.15 (0.51) <i>p</i> =0.775 |
| Upwork Hourly Rate | | -0.01 (0.01) <i>p</i> =0.582 | | 0.01 (0.01) <i>p</i> =0.291 | | 0.00 (0.01) <i>p</i> =0.814 |
| Total Earned on Upwork | | 0.01** (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.014 | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.108 | | -0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.947 |
| Number Upwork Jobs | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.750 | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.415 | | -0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.636 |
| Average Prior Upwork Rating | | 0.69 (0.43) <i>p</i> =0.109 | | -0.79** (0.34) <i>p</i> =0.020 | | -0.25 (2.7) <i>p</i> =0.928 |
| Constant | 4.17*** (0.13) <i>p</i> =0.000 | 0.62 (2.18) <i>p</i> =0.777 | 4.22*** (0.14) <i>p</i> =0.000 | 8.06*** (1.65) <i>p</i> =0.000 | 4.17*** (0.14) <i>p</i> =0.000 | 5.38 (13.64) <i>p</i> =0.694 |
| N | 131 | 122 | 149 | 141 | 109 | 99 |
| R-Squared | 0.012 | 0.088 | 0.004 | 0.049 | 0.027 | 0.064 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * *p*<.10, ** *p*<.05, *** *p*<.01.

Appendix T3: Logit Regression Results of Effect of Company Stance on Likelihood of Completing Any Extra Translations, within Employee Stance Subgroups

| <i>Employee Stance on Issue:</i> | Employee Disagrees | | Employee Agrees | | Employee Neutral | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
| Company Stance Agrees with Issue | -0.51 (0.31) <i>p</i> =0.10 | -0.56* (0.33) <i>p</i> =0.09 | 0.17 (0.28) <i>p</i> =0.54 | 0.08 (0.29) <i>p</i> =0.78 | -0.53 (0.35) <i>p</i> =0.13 | -0.49 (0.38) <i>p</i> =0.20 |
| Company Stance Disagrees with Issue | 0.04 (0.31) <i>p</i> =0.89 | -0.08 (0.33) <i>p</i> =0.81 | -0.33 (0.28) <i>p</i> =0.23 | -0.51* (0.30) <i>p</i> =0.09 | -0.46 (0.34) <i>p</i> =0.17 | -0.56 (0.37) <i>p</i> =0.13 |
| Male | | -0.18 (0.27) <i>p</i> =0.51 | | -0.28 (0.25) <i>p</i> =0.27 | | -0.52* (0.31) <i>p</i> =0.09 |
| Bachelors Degree | | 0.46 (0.28) <i>p</i> =0.11 | | -0.05 (0.25) <i>p</i> =0.84 | | 0.43 (0.31) <i>p</i> =0.16 |
| Masters Degree | | -0.37 (0.34) <i>p</i> =0.29 | | 0.35 (0.29) <i>p</i> =0.22 | | 0.07 (0.40) <i>p</i> =0.86 |
| PhD | | 0.10 (0.71) <i>p</i> =0.89 | | -0.71 (0.89) <i>p</i> =0.42 | | . . . <i>p</i> =0.29 |
| Upwork Hourly Rate | | -0.02 (0.02) <i>p</i> =0.21 | | -0.02 (0.02) <i>p</i> =0.29 | | 0.20 (0.02) <i>p</i> =0.29 |
| Total Earned on Upwork | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.77 | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.23 | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.69 |
| Number Upwork Jobs | | 0.00 (0.00) <i>p</i> =0.23 | | -0.01* (0.01) <i>p</i> =0.08 | | 0.00 (0.02) <i>p</i> =0.99 |
| Average Prior Upwork Rating | | -2.05 (1.34) <i>p</i> =0.12 | | -0.24 (1.08) <i>p</i> =0.83 | | 3.36** (1.66) <i>p</i> =0.04 |
| Constant | 0.21 (0.22) <i>p</i> =0.33 | 10.69 (6.73) <i>p</i> =0.11 | -0.06 (0.20) <i>p</i> =0.77 | 1.66 (5.39) <i>p</i> =0.76 | 0.41* (0.24) <i>p</i> =0.10 | -15.97* (8.24) <i>p</i> =0.05 |
| N | 254 | 239 | 318 | 296 | 210 | 192 |
| R-Squared | 0.034 | 0.054 | 0.031 | 0.061 | 0.002 | 0.039 |

Standard errors in parentheses. * *p*<.10, ** *p*<.05, *** *p*<.01.