**Getting Gig Workers to Do More by Doing Good:**

**Field Experimental Evidence from Online Platform Labor Marketplaces**

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This paper describes randomized field experiments implemented on two online labor market platforms examining the effect of employer charitable giving on a source of human capital that is becoming increasingly important to firms: the “gig” worker. It provides support that a message about charitable giving increases gig workers’ willingness to complete extra work, and that prosocially-oriented gig workers are most responsive. A process experiment reveals that sharing information about charitable giving increases how close workers feel to their gig employer, and that the effect is greater if workers previously felt distant from (as opposed to already felt close to) their employer. This paper provides insight into gig workers’ nonpecuniary motivation, explores heterogeneity in this type of workers’ responsiveness to charitable giving and illustrates how online platform labor markets can be used as a setting to implement field experiments examining effects of employer-level characteristics on gig worker behavior.

**Introduction**

The importance of human capital to organizational success has been well-established (Campbell, Ganco, Franco, & Agarwal, 2012; Coff, 1997; Huselid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997; Koch & McGrath, 1996). One source of human capital that is becoming increasingly prevalent in organizations, yet whose motivation has been under-examined, is the contingent or “gig” worker. A 2016 Deloitte study indicated that 42 percent of executives anticipate an increase in the use of contingent workers in the next three to five years. A 2013 Accenture study predicted that future competitive advantage will hinge on “workers who aren’t employees at all.”[[1]](#endnote-1) The emergence of the “gig” and “sharing” economies (Sundararajan, 2016) that enable companies to access “talent in the cloud” has contributed significantly to the prevalence of this type of worker in both smaller, entrepreneurial organizations as well as larger, established organizations (Kokkodis & Ipeirotis, 2016).[[2]](#endnote-2) Yet, there are few studies examining how employer-level characteristics influence the motivation of these non-traditional workers (Martins, Gilson, & Maynard, 2004), whose work experience has been noted to be different from those of traditional in-house employees (Bartel, Wrzesniewski, & Wiesenfeld, 2012; Chesbrough & Teece, 1998; Gibson & Cohen, 2003; Kirkman, Rosen, Tesluk, & Gibson, 2004; Wiesenfeld, Raghuram, & Garud, 2001).[[3]](#endnote-3)

One employer-level characteristic whose influence on traditional employee behavior has been explored in recent years is a firm’s charitable giving (Bode & Singh, 2017; Bode, Singh, & Rogan, 2015; Burbano, 2016). Proximity to and participation in charitable activities have been shown to drive the effects of this employer-level characteristic on traditional employee behavior (Bode et al., 2015; Kim, Lee, Lee, & Kim, 2010; Brockner, Senior, & Welch, 2014), making it theoretically unclear whether gig workers (who are physically distant from and do not participate in charitable activities) will in practice be motivated by employer charitable giving. On the other hand, charitable giving could increase gig workers’ feeling of affiliation with, and decrease how distant gig workers feel from, their gig employer. This in turn could positively influence gig workers’ perceptions about working for their employer (Wiesenfeld, Raghuram, & Garud, 1999; Wiesenfeld et al., 2001) and motivate them (Bolino & Turnley, 2003; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Organ & Ryan, 1995; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986). Indeed, the perception of distance from one’s employer is a characteristic specific to gig work which has been purported to have negative effects on workers perceptions of their work and their employing organization (Bartel et al., 2012; Friedman, 2014; Wiesenfeld et al., 2001). Gig workers have been shown to respond to employer corporate social responsibility (CSR) more broadly in the form of willingness to accept lower wages (Burbano, 2016), suggesting that motivating effects may dominate, though CSR is a multi-faceted construct that includes more than charitable giving. It is important to break down the construct of CSR into its distinct types of firm practices and activities when studying the effects of different types of CSR on outcomes of import to the firm (Burbano, Carlson, and Ostler, 2019; Burbano, Mamer, and Snyder, 2018; Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen, 2009). This paper does this by focusing on the effects of a single type of CSR – charitable giving – on gig worker behavior of import to the firm. It furthermore sheds light on a process through which corporate philanthropy influences perceptions specific to to gig workers, namely increasing gig workers’ perceptions of closeness to their gig employer.

To study a causal effect of an employer’s charitable giving on an important type of gig workers’ performance or effort, their willingness to go beyond what is required in their job contract, I implement field experiments on two multi-sided online labor platforms (Hagiu & Wright, 2015). The settings, Elance and Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), are both online platform labor marketplaces that connect workers with employers’ short-term jobs online.[[4]](#endnote-4) Elance is a particularly relevant gig labor marketplace. It is commonly cited as one of the gig economy platforms that will reshape the nature of companies’ workforces, as the freelance economy continues to grow and increasingly relies on online resources to connect to employers (Malone & Laubacher, 1998).[[5]](#endnote-5) These are thus prime settings in which to study gig workers’ response to employer-level characteristics such as charitable giving.

After hiring gig workers for short-term jobs on these online labor platforms, I randomly assigned whether they received information about their employer’s charitable giving, and then observed the effect of this charitable giving message on a type of on-the-job performance: their willingness to complete extra work unrequired for payment. I found that receiving information about their employer’s charitable giving caused gig workers to complete a statistically significant higher quantity of extra work unrequired for payment in the AMT setting. In the Elance setting, main effects were directionally consistent, but only marginally statistically significant with the inclusion of control variables. I found that prosocially-oriented gig workers were most responsive to the charitable giving message in the Elance setting, with directionally similar, but only marginally statistically significant, interaction effects in the AMT setting.

In a follow-up vignette experiment on AMT, I explore whether sharing information about employer charitable giving influences how close workers feel to their gig employer. Given that gig and virtual workers feel distant from their employers on average (Shamir & Salomon, 1985; Wiesenfeld, Raghuram, & Garud, 2001), and that this perception of distance common in gig work is purported to decrease motivation and identification with one’s employer (Bartel et al., 2012; Friedman, 2014; Wiesenfeld et al., 2001), decreasing the perception of distance from and increasing the perception of closeness to the gig employer could be one important process through which sharing information about the employer’s charitable giving positively influences gig workers. In this follow-up experiment, I find support that learning about a gig employer’s charitable giving program increases the perceived feeling of closeness towards the gig employer. Furthermore, I find that this effect is greater if the gig worker originally felt distant from (as opposed to already felt close to) the gig employer. Given that gig workers likely feel closer to their gig employers on platforms that enable and encourage communication (like Elance) as opposed to platforms which do not (like AMT), this finding helps shed light on a possible explanation for the asymmetry in the main field experimental results across the two gig worker settings.

This paper responds to a call for the increased use of field experiments in strategy-related research (Chatterji, Findley, Jensen, Meier, & Nielson, 2016), as well as in research related to sustainable development and social responsibility in organizations (Delmas & Aragon-Correa, 2016; Zollo, Cennamo, & Neumann, 2013). To investigate whether and how corporate philanthropy influences gig worker behavior, I employ both “strategy” field experiments, designed to evaluate main treatment effects on outcomes of import, and a “process” experiment, designed to shed light on a process or mechanism behind the main treatment effects of interest (Chatterji et al., 2016).

By examining the response of gig workers to an employer-level input, this paper contributes to the nascent strategic human capital literature examining the motivation and strategic management of non-traditional workers for organizational effectiveness and competitive advantage (Bartel et al., 2012; Chesbrough & Teece, 1998; Gibson & Cohen, 2003; Kirkman et al., 2004; Wiesenfeld et al., 2001). It has been noted that there are very few empirical studies examining how employers can effectively motivate and manage non-traditional workers despite the increasing prevalence of this type of worker (Martins et al., 2004). Though some scholars have begun to examine the task- or team-specific characteristics that influence contingent workers’ performance, such as task type (Straus & McGrath, 1994; Tan, Wei, Watson, Clapper, & McLean, 1998), communication context (Weisband & Atwater, 1999; Zack & McKenney, 1995), and team member characteristics (Ahuja, Galletta, & Carley, 2003; Ahuja & Galvin, 2003), this paper provides support that *employer*-level characteristics influence non-traditional workers as well. It further examines how heterogeneity in gig workers' attitudes and perceptions influence behavioral responses of import to firm value (Burtch, Carnahan, & Greenwood, 2016), on which there has been little focus to date (Martins et al., 2004). Lastly, given that the settings of focus in this paper are typical gig worker settings, the first two studies serve as an example of how researchers can implement field experiments in such settings to study causal effects of employee-level characteristics on revealed (rather than stated) gig worker behavior on the job. The third study serves as an example of how researchers can post-hoc examine non-identical findings across different field experimental settings, and insodoing provide further insight into the mechanism behind the main relationship of interest.

**Theory and Hypotheses**

Stakeholders develop their perception of employer merit, image, and reputation by interpreting signals (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) such as philanthropic activities (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Prospective and hired traditional (full-time) employees have been purported to interpret signals from CSR activities such as corporate philanthropy as positive indicators of unknown organizational characteristics, which results in pro-organizational behaviors (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Greening & Turban, 2000; Turban & Greening, 1997; Rupp, Ganapathi, Aguilera, & Williams, 2006; Rupp, Shao, Thornton, & Skarlicki, 2013).

Whether *gig* workers should exhibit pro-organizational behavior such as completing extra work unrequired for payment in response to employer charitable giving is theoretically unclear, however. On the one hand, perceived proximity to and participation in charitable giving and other socially responsible activities have been shown to drive the effects of these employer-level characteristics on traditional employee behavior (Bode et al., 2015; Brockner et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2010). When working remotely, gig workers are physically and emotionally distant from their employer, however (Mann & Holdsworth, 2003; Shamir & Salomon, 1985; Wiesenfeld et al., 2001), and do not participate in corporate philanthropic activities like volunteer programs and other initiatives that involve employees in charitable giving.[[6]](#endnote-6) Extrapolating from this literature which emphasizes the importance of *participation* in the charitable giving activities thus suggests that gig workers’ responses to employer charitable giving should be muted.

On the other hand, literature on the motivation of virtual workers (which would include most contingent, gig workers, but also non-gig workers such as fulltime employees who telecommute or are otherwise physically distant from their employer) (Wiesenfeld, Raghuram, & Garud, 1999; Wiesenfeld et al., 2001) has found that in a virtual work context that lacks traditional mechanisms of workplace connection (e.g., facilitated by being in a shared physical space), employer characteristics that address virtual workers’ need for affiliation and connection positively influence organizational identification and commitment (Weisenfeld et al., 2001). Organizational identification and commitment have in turn been shown to influence a willingness to go above and beyond what is contractually required (Bolino & Turnley, 2003; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Organ & Ryan, 1995; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986)—sometimes called “organizational citizenship behavior,” (Morrison, 1994; Organ, 1988) or “prosocial organizational behavior” (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986), and includes behavior such as completing extra work unrequired for payment. Learning about an employer’s charitable giving could improve gig workers’ sense of connection or closeness to their employing organization and thus positively influence the amount of prosocial organizational behavior put forth, which would include the amount of extra work unrequired for payment that they would complete.

Related empirical work examining the effect of social responsibility more broadly on employee outcomes in gig worker contexts suggests that gig workers should indeed be responsive to such employer-level characteristics, despite the theoretical reasons that distance from and lack of participation in the program could limit effects. For example, prospective workers in gig settings have been shown to be willing to accept lower payment amounts to work for socially responsible employers (Burbano, 2016), and hired gig workers have been shown to cheat less when working for socially responsible employers (Burbano and Chiles, 2018). This suggests that the motivational effects likely outweigh the dampening of the effects. I thus predict that:

*H1: Informing gig workers about their employer’s charitable giving program will cause*

*them to complete a higher quantity of extra work for that employer, on average, compared to not informing gig workers about their employer’s charitable giving program, all else*

*equal.*

**Prosocial orientation.** A gig worker’s prosocial orientation is likely to moderate the treatment effect of interest (H1), though the direction in which it will do so is unclear. On one hand, the connection and closeness felt to an organization should be higher if the organization has characteristics similar to those of the worker’s self-concept (Dutton, Dukertic and Harquail, 1994). It has been noted that the utility of working for a prosocial organization should be higher if the employee values or has a preference for prosocial outcomes (Evans & Davis, 2011), which is the case of morally inclined or prosocially-oriented individuals (Rupp et al., 2013). Thus, the connection and closeness felt to an organization that itself engages in prosocial activities should be higher for prosocially-oriented workers. This would imply that the treatment effect of working for an employer that engages in corporate philanthropy should be greater for prosocially-oriented individuals such that prosocial orientation positively moderates the treatment effect hypothesized above.

On the other hand, prosocial actions in one domain can cause individuals to feel moral license to behave less prosocially, or even badly, in other contexts (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Merrit, Effron and Monin 2010). Prosocially-oriented individuals, who act prosocially in non-work domains, have higher levels of moral self-regard (Monin & Jordan, 2009). When a worker’s moral self-regard is higher, he or she is *less* likely to engage in organizational citizenship behavior (Klotz and Bolino, 2013). The baseline higher level of moral self-regard amongst prosocially oriented gig workers, then, could result in a muted, or lower*,* treatment effect of corporate philanthropy on workers’ willingness to engage in organizational citizenship behavior including completing extra work for a gig employer.

Both lines of argument suggest a moderating effect of prosocial orientation, though the direction in which prosocial orientation will moderate the treatment effect of interest is an empirical question.

*H2: Gig workers’ prosocial orientation will moderate the treatment effect of informing gig workers about their employer’s charitable giving program on the quantity of extra work completed for the employer.*

**Empirical Setting**

To examine whether gig workers respond to employer charitable giving with an increased willingness to do extra work, I implement field experiments on the online platform labor marketplaces Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) and Elance. AMT jobs, called HITs (an acronym for human intelligence tasks), typically take only a few minutes to complete, with more complex or time-consuming tasks broken into a series of smaller HITs. Typical jobs include simple data entry and survey completion. The average effective wage of an AMT worker is $4.80 per hour (Mason & Suri, 2012). A benefit of the AMT setting is that it is possible to gather a large sample and exert high control over the randomization process (since all instructions are automated online, and there is no communication between employer and worker during a job). As completion of surveys is common on AMT, it is also a natural context in which to ask questions to begin to study the mechanisms driving results. A downside of the AMT setting is that jobs are very short and remuneration is small, making the generalizability of studies in this setting to gig jobs more broadly more challenging.

A benefit of the Elance setting is that it is one of the most commonly used job sites for gig workers. It has twelve million registered freelancers and five million registered clients. Three million jobs are posted annually, worth $1B USD, making it one of the largest freelancer marketplaces. Typical jobs take days or weeks to complete, and payment amounts are in the tens or hundreds of dollars. They include such categories as IT and programming, administrative support, design and multimedia, and even engineering and manufacturing. The average hourly wage for U.S. freelancers on Elance is $28, which translates into an annual income of $56,000 (Eha, 2013), which is comparable to the average annual U.S. household income. A tradeoff of the Elance setting is that it is uncommon to attract or hire hundreds of workers for the same job (which is common on AMT), resulting in a smaller sample size. Surveys are also rarely administered in Elance, so to keep the job being studied typical of other Elance jobs, I did not ask many survey questions at the end of the experiment. Steps must also be taken to ensure that communication between the employee and employer during the job on Elance does not bias results. I did this by ensuring that results are robust to including controls for the degree of positivity in communication between the employee and employer.

By implementing field experiments in both settings, I sought to increase the robustness and generalizability of my main results, drawing from Chatterji et al. (2016), who emphasize the value of replicating field experiments in different settings when possible. In what follows, I first describe the AMT experiment design and results, followed by those of the Elance experiment. I then discuss the differences in the findings across the two settings and describe a post-hoc vignette experiment intended to explore a potential explanation for the differences in findings. I thus demonstrate how differences in findings across two field experimental settings can lead the researcher to continue investigation of the relationship of interest in such a way that post-hoc analyses (in this case, implemented as a follow-up experiment) further inform our understanding of the mechanism behind the main relationship of focus. IRB approval was obtained for all experiments.

**Field Experiment 1 (AMT)**

**Design**. I advertised a data-gathering HIT on AMT for payment of $0.50.[[7]](#endnote-7) Though seemingly low, the payment amount, nature of the job, and description were, by design, constructed to be typical of other AMT jobs at the time. Hired workers were taken to an external survey site to complete the HIT. Workers were given detailed instructions for the job, which consisted of gathering 10 data points from a website and completing a short survey. They were given a sample data-entry question and were instructed to enter an answer for feedback.[[8]](#endnote-8)

To construct a proxy for charitable giving treatment, workers were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a control group or a charitable giving treatment group. The control and treatment groups received different messages (see Figure 1 for the exact messages). The treatment group received information about the employer’s corporate philanthropy. A supplementary study confirmed that the control condition of providing no information is statistically equivalent in terms of influence on extra work completed as providing generic information about the employer, and as providing information about charitable giving behavior more broadly (and not in the context of the employer).[[9]](#endnote-9)

\*Insert Figure 1 here\*

After receiving the control or treatment message described in Figure 1, workers received feedback about whether their answer to the sample question was correct and what the correct answer was. Workers were prompted to enter the 10 required data-entry points, then asked if they were willing to complete additional data-entry points, which were optional and not required for payment. Those willing were provided 20 more data-entry queries and could provide answers to none, some, or all of them. Workers were then surveyed to gather information on demographic and other characteristics. They were paid at the end of the job.

**Sample**

Six hundred workers living in the United States, with HIT approval ratings of 95 percent or higher, were recruited on AMT for this field experiment.[[10]](#endnote-10) Thirty-two observations were dropped due to (a) repeat IP addresses, suggesting that a worker may have participated in the experiment more than once; (b) starting but not completing the HIT; or (c) answering that the worker has worked for the hiring employer before.[[11]](#endnote-11) Twenty-nine individuals who did not complete the HIT exited after the random assignment of conditions; there was no statistically significant difference between the control and treatment groups in likelihood of exiting.[[12]](#endnote-12) This suggests that selection bias due to attrition is minimal. The resulting sample size is 568 workers, of which 241 completed at least one of the unrequired data points.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for workers in the sample, by condition. Approximately half of the workers were female, the mean age was 30 years, and approximately half of the workers had a college degree. Approximately three quarters of the workers answered that the reason they complete HITs on MTurk is for the money earned from these HITs. This suggests that, although the payment amount received on AMT is low, the money earned on these HITs is important and relevant for these workers. As there were no statistically significant differences (*p* > 0.10) between the mean characteristics listed in Table 1 for the treatment and control groups, this suggests that selection bias due to observables is minimal.

\*Insert Table 1 here\*

**Variable Construction**

**Dependent variables.** *# optional data points* *completed* is the number of optional data points (out of 20) that the worker completed, and is a proxy for the quantity of extra work completed unrequired for payment. This can range from 0 (no extra work) to 20 (the maximum amount of extra work possible).

**Independent variables.** *Charitable giving message* is a dummy coded 1 if the worker received information about the corporate philanthropy program and 0 otherwise.

**Control variables***.* Control variables which are theoretically likely to influence the amount of extra work that a gig worker would complete are added to regression specifications as controls. As women are considered to be more willing to complete extra work above and beyond what is required than men (Organ & Ryan, 1995), I control for the gender of the gig workers. *Female* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is female and 0 if the worker is male. Prior work performance and experience has been shown to be positively correlated with job performance (see Quinones, Ford, & Teachout, 1995 for a meta-analysis of effects of work experience on job performance). As such, I include as controls measures for AMT work performance and experience. *HIT approval rating* is a proxy for prior AMT performance and takes the values 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, or 100. *HITs per week buckets* is a proxy for prior AMT experience and is an ordinal variable with the following values: 1 if the worker completed less than 10 HITs per week in the past month, 2 if the worker completed 10 to 49, 3 if the worker completed 50 to 100, and 4 if the worker complete more than 100.

**Moderating variable.** To test H2, I use a proxy for prosocial orientation that has been used in previous studies (Cassar & Meier, 2017): workers’ volunteer and donation history.*Volunteer & donate* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker volunteered and donated to charity in the prior year and 0 otherwise.

**Results**

Figure 2 presents the kernel density estimations for the number of optional data points completed, by condition. The treatment group completed more optional data points (mean 7.3 vs. 5.8, t(563) = -2.01, *p <* 0.05) than the control group, consistent with H1.

\*Insert Figure 2 here\*

Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 report regression results designed to test H1. Model 1 shows that workers who received a philanthropy message completed on average 1.49 more optional data points than those who did not (*p* < 0.05).[[13]](#endnote-13) This represents an increase of about 25 percent compared to the control group. Though a small amount, this represents 15% of the total amount of data points that they were required to complete for the job. Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of the philanthropy message on the number of optional data points completed holds when control variables are added to the regression, providing further support for H1.

Models 3 and 4 add the interaction of *Volunteer & donate* with *Charitable giving message* to the regression specification to test H2. Workers who volunteered with and donated money to charity in the previous year completed directionally less optional data points on average than those who did not volunteer or donate (*𝛽* = -2.06, p<0.10 without controls; *𝛽* = -2.60, *p* < 0.05 with controls). This is in line with existing literature examining the relationship between volunteerism outside of work and job performance (Rodell, 2013) which has suggested that individuals who devote resources to one activity (such as volunteerism) will devote fewer resources to another activity (such as doing extra work on the job) (Edwards & Rothbard, 2000; Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985), in addition to literature which suggests that moral licensing may cause those who behave prosocially in one domain to behave less prosocially in another domain (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Merrit, Effron and Monin 2010). Models 3 and 4 provide weak support for H2. Workers who volunteered and donated in the past were directionally more responsive to receiving information about their employer’s corporate philanthropy program than individuals who had not volunteered or donated, though this effect is not statistically significant at the 10% cutoff for a two-tailed test, (*𝛽* = 2.39, *p*=0.15 without controls, *B*=2.78 with controls, *p* =0.11).[[14]](#endnote-14)

\*Insert Table 2 here\*

**Field Experiment 2 (Elance)**

**Design**. A job “data entry into Excel from websites” was advertised on Elance in coordination with a small start-up organization.[[15]](#endnote-15) The job was to fill in an Excel database with at least the top 50 Twitter users per category (for three categories), gathered from a website. Interested applicants submitted a proposal on the Elance website, including bid amount. All workers who submitted complete proposals and bid less than $100 for the job were hired.[[16]](#endnote-16) After workers were hired, they were asked to click on a link to receive information about the hiring company, gather their information, and to receive more detailed instructions about the job. Via this link, participants were first asked a few optional questions about themselves.[[17]](#endnote-17) All workers were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions: (1) a charitable giving treatment group that received information about the employer’s charitable giving program or (2) a control group that received generic information about the employer.[[18]](#endnote-18) (See Figure 3 for the messages corresponding to each condition.) After receiving their messages, workers were given detailed instructions about the job, as well as the website from which to pull information and an Excel file to fill out (all workers received the same website and Excel file, by design, though they did not know this). In the job instructions, it was noted that, although information only the top 50 Twitter users in three requested categories (150 total) were required for payment, information on more users was always helpful for the hiring company, and would be welcome. There were 1081 possible extra entries on the website.[[19]](#endnote-19) Workers completed the job within two weeks, and submitted their final work product (the filled-out Excel file) via Elance. Upon completion of the job, all workers were paid through the Elance payment system. After paying them, they were asked to take an optional one-minute survey.

\*Insert Figure 3 here\*

**Sample**

Ninety-four individuals were offered the job. After dropping those who did not accept the job and observations with duplicate IP addresses (an indication that the job was completed more than once by the same person under different Elance aliases, which would result in treatment contamination), the resulting sample size is 70 observations. None of the workers dropped out of the job after random assignment of conditions. Not all workers answered the optional survey questions (69 started the optional survey, and 66 answered all the optional survey questions).

Table 3 reports summary statistics for the sample by condition. The difference in mean proportion of workers *living in Central or South America* was statistically significant (p<0.10). [[20]](#endnote-20) Based on Elance metrics, workers, on average, earned $2,830 from previous Elance jobs, completed 22 previous Elance jobs, and earned 4.8 stars (out of 5) based on employers’ ratings from previous Elance jobs. Forty-nine percent of the workers were women. Based on self-reported data gathered during the survey, the average prosocial orientation rating was 4.2.[[21]](#endnote-21) The mean bid amount for the job amongst hired workers was $35.16.

\*Insert Table 3 here\*

**Measures**

**Dependent variable***.**# unrequired data entries* is the number of unrequired extra data entries completed (i.e., the number of completed data entries above the required 150 entries). This can range from 0 (no extra data entries completed) to 1081 (the maximum number of extra data entries completed).

**Independent variable**.*Charitable giving message* is a dummy variable coded 1 if the worker received information about the company’s charitable giving program and 0 otherwise.

**Control variables***.*Variables which are likely to influence willingness to complete extra work are included as controls. *Female* is a dummy variable. Gender was classified based on pictures and names on the virtual worker’s Elance profile. *Performance on previous Elance jobs* indicates the average number of stars (out of 5) awarded to the worker by previous Elance employers and is a proxy for prior work performance on this gig worker platform. *Earnings from previous Elance jobs* is a continuous variable for the amount earned on Elance prior to completion of the job (in USD) and is a proxy for amount of prior Elance experience. *Living in Central or South America* is a dummy variable included as a control variable due to imperfect randomization of this characteristic across the treatment and control groups.

**Moderating variable***.**Prosocial orientation* is a continuous variable operationalized as the average of responses to 5-point Likert scale questions commonly used to assess individuals’ prosocial motivation taken from Grant (2008). Specifically, participants were asked to indicate how much they agree or disagree with these statements: “I care about benefitting others”; “I want to help others”; “It is important to me to do good for others.” Cronbach’s alpha scale reliability coefficient is 0.80, which suggests internal consistency among these responses, making it reasonable to combine these measures into a single index. I employed this proxy for prosocial orientation (rather than volunteer and donation history as in the AMT study) to explore an alternative proxy for prosocial orientation. I later discuss the differences between these proxies and how they could explain differences in results in support of H2 across the two field experiments.

**Results**

Figure 4 presents the kernel density estimations of *# unrequired data entries* for the control and philanthropy treatment groups.

\*Insert Figure 4 here\*

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are reported in Table 4. Model 1 shows that without inclusion of control variables, workers in the treatment group completed a directionally, but not statistically significant, higher number of optional data points than the control group ( = 125, *p* =0.19). Model 2 includes control variables which could intuitively influence the number of unrequired entries completed, as well as *Living in Central and South America* due to imperfect randomization of this geographic location characteristic across the control and treatment groups. With inclusion of these controls, information about the corporate philanthropy program resulted in completion of 184 more unrequired data points, though this effect is only marginally significant ( = 184, *p* < 0.10), providing weak support for H1.

Providing support of H2, Model 3 shows that workers who are more prosocially oriented are more responsive to a corporate philanthropy message ( =319, *p* < 0.05). The regression specification in Model 4 examines an alternative operationalization of the prosocial orientation variable: a binary indicator variable for whether the individual is above or below the median prosocial scale amount (which was 4 out of 5). The coefficient on the interaction term is again positive and statistically significant ( = 365, *p* < 0.05), providing support that prosocial orientation positively moderates the treatment effect of corporate philanthropy information on amount of extra work completed for the gig employer.

\*Insert Table 4 here\*

**Discussion and Exploration of Explanations for Differences in Results Across the Field Experiments**

Chatterji et al. (2016) emphasize the value of conducting similar field experiments in different settings. Indeed, when complementary field experiments generate the same findings, this increases confidence in the robustness of the findings. In cases when complementary field experiments result in different findings, or result in directionally similar findings that vary in the strength or statistical significance of the findings, as was the case in this paper, this can present an opportunity to investigate post-hoc explanations for what might be driving differences in results. In some cases, differences across the field experimental settings can enable the researcher to post-hoc hypothesize heterogenous effects or processes that enhance our understanding of the relationship of interest.

The main effect of corporate philanthropy treatment on willingness to complete extra work (H1) was statistically significant (p<0.05) in the AMT study, but only marginally statistically significant in the Elance study with inclusion of control variables (p<0.l0). This could be due to the lower sample size of the Elance study, or other differences such as the higher pay and longer-term nature of the job. Another plausible post-hoc explanation stems from the literature on virtual work, and suggests a possible mechanism through which charitable giving could influence workers’ perceptions about their employer. Indeed, the perceived distance from one’s employer has been posited to drive negative attitudes and behaviors in remote, virtual, and gig workers (Shamir & Salomon, 1985; Weisenfeld, Raghuram, & Garud, 2001). It has been noted that there are different degrees of perceived distance in virtual or gig work (Martins et al., 2004), and it is plausible that gig workers originally feel more distant from their employers on AMT, where they do not interact or communicate with their employers during the job, than on Elance, where workers can interact and communicate frequently with their employers via a communication portal during the course of the job. Certainly, interaction with their organizations is particularly important for virtual and gig workers (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Wiesenfeld et al., 1999).

Learning about a company’s charitable giving could have motivational effects on gig employees by increasing the perception of closeness to and decreasing the perception of distance from a gig employer. It is also possible that the effects of learning about a gig employer’s charitable giving program on perceptions of closeness/distance would be greater if workers originally feel more distant from their employer. If they already feel close to their employer, the effects of learning about a gig employer’s charitable giving program on how close they feel to their employer would likely be smaller. I thus hypothesize:

*H3:* *Informing gig workers about their employer’s charitable giving program*

*will increase their perception of feeling close to their employer, all else equal.*

*H4: Gig workers’ prior perception of feeling distant from (as opposed to already*

*feeling close to) to their gig employer will strengthen the treatment effect of informing gig*

*workers about their employer’s charitable giving program on their perception of feeling close to their employer, all else equal.*

**Process Vignette Experiment on AMT**

To test the above hypotheses, I conduct a vignette experiment on Amazon Mechanial Turk. Such experiments are particularly useful for uncovering micro-processes of relevance to the strategy field (Di Stefano and Gutierrez, 2018).

**Design**. I advertised a survey response job on AMT. Participants were taken to an external survey site to complete the survey. After agreeing to consent to complete a survey designed to learn about what is important to people who do gig work, participants were told to imagine that they had been hired to work on a short term gig assignment for an employer, and informed that a hypothetical gig assignment scenario/employer would be described and that they would then be asked questions about how they would feel about working on this gig assignment. They were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 conditions, corresponding to a 2x2 design (originally feel close to vs. originally feel distant from gig employer) x (corporate philanthropy information vs. generic employer information). The exact wording of the messages corresponding to each of the four conditions is described in Figure 5.

\*Insert Figure 5 here\*

Workers were then asked, “How close do you feel to the previously described hypothetical gig employer?” and responses were gathered on a 7 point-Likert scale. Workers were next surveyed for demographic and AMT experience characteristics, and information about how much of their work is complete on gig worker platforms. They were paid $0.50 at the end of the HIT.

**Sample.** Four hundred gig workers living in the United States, with HIT approval ratings of 95 percent or higher, and who have completed at least 100 HITs, were recruited on AMT for this experiment. Observations were dropped due to (a) repeat IP addresses, suggesting that a worker may have participated in the experiment more than once or (b) not correctly answering attention check questions. No individuals exited after the random assignment of conditions. The resulting sample size is 347 gig workers.

Table 5 presents summary statistics for workers in the sample, by condition. The only demographic characteristics not well-randomized across conditions were Republican (*p* < 0.10), Independent political orientation (*p* < 0.10), and Volunteer and donation history (*p* < 0.05).

\*Insert Table 5 here\*

**Variable Construction**

**Dependent variables.** *Feel close to gig employer* indicates how close the participant indicated that she felt to the hypothetical gig employer after the random assignment of conditions, on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from “1=very distant to 7=very close.”

**Independent variables.** *Previously felt close to employer* is a dummy coded 1 if the gig worker was told to imagine that she felt close to the employer because she knew that she would communicate with the employer during the gig assignment (that is, if randomly assigned to either the “Corporate Philanthropy & Originally Felt Close ” or the “No Corporate Philanthropy & Originally Felt Close” conditions), and coded 0 if the gig worker was told to imagine that she felt distant from the gig employer because she knew that she would not communicate with the employer during the gig assignment (assigned to either the “Corporate Philanthropy & Originally Felt Distant” or the “No Corporate Philanthropy & Originally Felt Distant conditions). *Charitable giving message* is a dummy coded 1 if the gig worker was told to imagine that the employer then shared information about the corporate philanthropy program (that is, if randomly assigned to either the “Corporate Philanthropy & Originally Felt Close” or the “Corporate Philanthropy & Originally Felt Distant” condition), and 0 otherwise (assigned to either the “No Corporate Philanthropy & Originally Felt Close” or “No Corporate Philanthropy & Originally Felt Distant” conditions).

**Control variables***.* A variable which is intuitively likely to influence the degree of closeness that participants feel to the hypothetical gig employer, the *Proportion of work that is gig work* (as opposed to non-gig work), is included in regression results as a control variable. This is a continuous variable ranging from 0-100 representing the proportion of work that the worker completes on gig work platforms. Observable characteristics that were not well-randomized across conditions (p<0.10 in Table 5) are also included in regression specifications. *Republican* and *Independent* are each dummy variables for the corresponding political affiliation. *Volunteered & donated* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant volunteered and donated in the past year, and 0 otherwise.

**Results**

Table 6 presents the mean reported perceptions of closeness to the gig employer (standard deviations in parentheses) for each of the conditions. As would be expected, participants told to imagine that they felt distant from their employer reported that they felt less close to their employer (3.06 when charitable giving information is shared and 2.35 when no charitable giving information is shared) than participants when told to imagine that they felt close to their employer (5.36 when charitable giving is shared and 5.19 when no charitable giving is shared). Charitable giving information increased the perception of closeness to the employer when the participants were told to imagine that they initially felt distant from their employer (3.06 vs. 2.35, p<0.001). In cases where the participants were told to imagine that they initially felt close to their gig employer, the perception of closeness to the employer after charitable giving information was shared was statistically equivalent to after generic company information was shared (5.36 vs. 5.19, p>0.10).

\*Insert Table 6 here\*

Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 report OLS regression results designed to test H3. Model 1 shows that workers who received a philanthropy message reported feeling closer to their gig employer than those who did not receive a philanthropy message (*p* <0.001). Model 2 demonstrates that this effect holds when controls that were not well-randomized across conditions and those that could intuitively influence how close the participant would report feeling to the gig employer (proportion of work that is gig work) are included in the regression. Models 1 and 2 thus provide support for H3. The interaction terms in Models 3 and 4 provides support for H4. The effect of charitable giving message treatment on perceived closeness to the employer is lower if the gig worker previously (imagined that she) already felt close to the employer than if the gig worker (imagined that she) felt distant from the gig employer (*B*= -0.54, p<0.05 without controls and *B*= -0.56, p<0.05 with controls). This offers a potential explanation for why the effect of charitable giving treatment was statistically significant in the AMT setting, where the gig workers likely feel more distant from their employer, and only marginally significant in the Elance setting, where the gig workers likely feel closer to their employer due to the higher level of communication and interaction with the employer.

\*Insert Table 7 here\*

The moderating effect of individuals’ prosocial orientation (H2) was more strongly supported in the Elance field experiment than the AMT field experiment. The differing degrees of support of H2 across the two field experiments is likely explained by the different proxies used for prosocial orientation in each of the studies: the Elance study used Grant (2008)’s commonly-used prosocial scale and the AMT study used volunteer and donation history, which has been used as a proxy for prosocial orientation in other studies (Cassar & Meier, 2017). To explore this possibility, I examine the correlation between individuals’ Grant (2008) prosocial scale responses and volunteer & donation history during the vignette study. I find a low correlation: (corr = 0.21, N=347). This suggests that these two measures are capturing somewhat different individual-level characteristics, and likely explains the differences in support of H2 across the two studies. Indeed, it has been pointed out that differences in measures of concepts such as public services or prosocial motivation lead to different empirical results (Perry, Hondeghem, & Wise, 2010). Given differences in the two operationalizations of prosocial orientation, it would have been ideal to include both in each field experiment. On Elance, there is a tradeoff to doing so (since on a typical Elance job and employer would not ask many survey questions), though on AMT where workers are used to being asked survey questions, there would be little tradeoff to doing so.

**Conclusions**

Field experiments implemented on two online gig labor markets provided support that charitable giving has a positive effect on gig workers’ willingness to go beyond what was required for their employer. These studies explored the nonpecuniary motivation of a type of worker—the gig or contingent worker—who is becoming increasingly important for firms. The results from the two field experiments were directionally similar but varied in their strength of support for the hypotheses that charitable giving increases gig workers’ willingness to do extra work for their employer and that prosocial orientation positively moderates this treatment effect.

This paper illustrates a potential challenge in seeking to replicate findings in two different field experimental settings; at times, the results will not perfectly replicate. In these instances, there can be opportunities for the researcher to consider whether differences across the two settings might explain the differences in findings, and to generate and test post-hoc hypotheses that can serve to both explain the different findings as well as facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the main relationship of interest.

A third post-hoc experiment for this purpose provided support that sharing information about an employer’s charitable giving increased the feeling of closeness towards and decreased the feeling of distance from the gig employer. It furthermore suggested that heterogeneity in a gig-worker specific characteristic – how close versus distant the gig worker originally feels from her gig employer – moderates the relationship of this effect. Specifically, the effect was greater for gig employees who originally felt more distant from their gig employer. This finding offers a potential explanation as to why the treatment effect of charitable giving was statistically significant in the AMT setting but only marginally significant in the Elance setting, since it is likely that gig workers originally feel more distant from their employers on AMT than on Elance.

The online labor marketplaces used in this paper are prime contexts in which to study gig workers. The jobs used in the field experiments were data-entry focused. Future work could explore whether and how effects differ when jobs are of a different type (e.g., more creative and innovative in nature). Future work could also build on the post-hoc vignette experiment by actually manipulating the closeness of the gig worker to its employer, rather than using vignettes to induce the worker to imagine feeling close or distant to their employer, or by employing composite measures of self-reported closeness to the gig employer.

Extant work examining the strategic human capital management of non-traditional workers such as virtual workers has mainly focused on team- and individual-level characteristics that influence the productivity of these workers (Martins et al., 2004). This paper suggests that an *employer*-level characteristic can influence the productivity of non-traditional workers, and points to the promise of exploring the effects of other types of CSR inputs and other employer-level characteristics on non-traditional workers’ productivity. The finding that gig workers who originally feel more distant from their gig employers are more responsive to information about employer charitable giving responds to a call to examine heterogeneous attitudes amongst virtual workers (Martins et al., 2004).

This paper also speaks to scholars examining the effects of charitable giving and social responsibility more broadly on (traditional) employee behavior (Arragon-Correa, Martin-Tapia, & Hurtado-Torres, 2013; Bode & Singh, 2017; Bode et al., 2015; Burbano, 2016; Burbano, Mamer, & Snyder, 2018; Flammer & Luo, 2014; Flammer & Kacperczyk, 2017), as well as those examining the microfoundations of corporate social responsibility (Shea and Hawn, 2017). Some of the studies demonstrating a relationship between social responsibility and employee performance have used cross-sectional field data (e.g., Hansen, Dunford, Boss, Boss, & Angermeier, 2011) or individual-level self-reported perception data (Rupp et al., 2006; Rupp et al., 2013). This paper builds on field and lab experiments that have shown that making the impact of a public service or nonprofit job more salient influences work effort (Chandler & Kapelner, 2013; Fehrler & Kosfeld, 2014; Grant, et al., 2007; Grant, 2008; Grant & Hofmann, 2011) by examining a related effect in a for-profit context. It also complements real effort experiments implemented with undergraduate student samples aware they are participating in experiments, which have demonstrated a positive effect of linking charitable donations to task efficiency (Tonin & Vlassopoulos, 2010, 2015), by demonstrating a complementary effect of sharing information about the employer’s charitable giving on workers’ willingness to complete extra work unrequired for payment. A critical component to the set of field experiments in this paper is that the sample of non-student workers completing work in their real-world work context are never aware of their participation in a study, which could otherwise lead to social desirability bias (List, 2009). This paper also complements that of Burbano (2016), which examined the effect of socially responsible messages on (gig) workers at a different stage in the stakeholder-employer relationship: prospective workers before they are (or are not) hired, and found a different type of worker to be most responsive (higher performing workers).

The treatment effect of corporate philanthropy on worker performance explored in this paper is a mechanism distinct from those put forth in the formal theoretical CSR literature, where it has been suggested, for example, that there is a labor-market screening effect of CSR with implications for employee performance (e.g., as suggested by Albinger & Freeman, 2000; Brekke & Nyborg, 2008; Fehrler & Kosfeld, 2014). In this paper, any selection effect is controlled for, as the random assignment of conditions takes place after gig workers have selected into working on the job.[[22]](#endnote-22) Whether and how self-selection and treatment effects interact with implications for the overall effect on gig employee productivity can be explored in future research.

From a practical perspective, this paper suggests that managers could benefit from highlighting their firm’s charitable giving activities to gig and contingent workers, particularly if their workers communicate infrequently with and are likely to feel distant to their gig employers, or are prosocially oriented. Though corporate philanthropy programs are commonly highlighted during full-time employee career fairs and other recruiting initiatives, managers note that they are rarely highlighted during the recruiting of gig employees.[[23]](#endnote-23) As the strategic management of gig workers becomes increasingly important to the firm (Chesbrough & Teece, 1998; Gibson & Cohen, 2003; Kirkman et al., 2004), tools such as these will become increasingly relevant to managers.

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
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**Figures and Tables**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Figure 1. Message received, by condition**  **Field Experiment 1 (AMT)** | |
| **Control group**  **(1)** | **Philanthropy treatment group**  **(2)** |
| We are processing your answer. Click on "continue" after the button appears at the bottom right of this page. This should take approximately 15 seconds. Thank you for your patience. | |
|  | In the meantime, we would like to tell you about one of our philanthropic programs.  Charitable Giving ProgramWe have a longstanding tradition of giving back to the community.   In 2012, we donated 1% of our profit to charities doing important work in our community.  In 2013, we will continue to identify the nonprofit organizations that contribute to the well-being of the broader community.  The recipients of our 2012 donations were: |
|  | The American Red Cross enables communities to prepare for and respond to natural disasters.  The Boys and Girls Clubs of America enables young people to reach their full potential.  The Cancer Research Institute supports and coordinates lab and clinical efforts towards the treatment, control and prevention of cancer.  The Global Hunger Project works towards the sustainable end of hunger and poverty.  The Greenpeace Fundincreases public awareness and understanding of environmental issues. |

**Figure 2. Kernel densities of number of optional data points completed, by condition**

**Field Experiment 1 (AMT)**



|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Figure 3. Message received, by condition**  **Field Experiment 2 (Elance)** | |
| **Control group**  **(1)** | **Philanthropy treatment group**  **(2)** |
| Thank you, we are processing your answers. This will only take 15 seconds.  In the meantime, we are very proud of, and wanted to tell you about, | |
| our company.  {Firm Name Omitted} IncorporatedFounded in 2014,   we are a privately owned company that provides a range of services to our clients.   In 2015, we will continue our important work.  Our services include but are not limited to: | our charitable giving program.  {Firm Name Omitted} Incorporated GivesWe have a tradition of giving back to the communities where our workers live and work.   In 2014, we donated 1% of our profit to charities doing important work in our community.  In 2015, we will continue this important work.  The recipients of our 2014 donations were: |
| Data gathering and analysis seek and synthesize data information.   Internet research capture and analyze quantitative and qualitative information from the internet.   Statistical consulting use the art and science of statistics to solve practical problems.  Forecasting use data to make predictions about events whose outcomes have not yet been observed.  Pattern recognitionanalyze patterns and regularities in data. | The American Red Cross enables communities to prepare for and respond to natural disasters.  The Boys and Girls Clubs of America enables young people to reach their full potential.  The Cancer Research Institute supports and coordinates lab and clinical efforts towards the treatment, control and prevention of cancer.  The Global Hunger Project works towards the sustainable end of hunger and poverty.  The Greenpeace Fundincreases public awareness and understanding of environmental issues. |

**Figure 4. Kernel densities of number of additional entries, by condition**

**Field Experiment 2 (Elance)**

****

**Figure 5. Message received, by condition**

**Vignette Experiment (AMT)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Corporate Philanthropy Message** | **No Corporate Philanthropy Message** |
| **Previously Felt Close to Gig Employer** | Imagine that you feel close to the gig employer because you know you will communicate with the employer during the gig assignment.  The employer then shares with you that the company you are working for has a corporate philanthropy program and a tradition of giving back to the communities where their workers live and work. | Imagine that you feel close to the gig employer because you know you will communicate with the employer during the gig assignment.    The employer then shares with you the year that the company was founded. |
| **Previously Felt Distant from Gig Employer** | Imagine that you feel distant from the gig employer because you know you will not communicate with the employer during the gig assignment.  The employer then shares with you that the company you are working for has a corporate philanthropy program and a tradition of giving back to the communities where their workers live and work. | Imagine that you feel distant from the gig employer because you know you will not communicate with the employer during the gig assignment.  The employer then shares with you the year that the company was founded. |

**Table 1. Worker characteristics: summary statistics, by condition (randomization balance)**

**Field Experiment 1 (AMT)**

N=568, except for HIT approval rate (N=544). P-values are based on independent sample t-tests, and are robust to the use of chi-squared tests for categorical values.

**Table 2. OLS regression results**

**DV: # Optional data points completed**

**(can take values of 0-20)**

**Field Experiment 1 (AMT)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|  | (H1) | (H1) | (H2) | (H2) |
| Charitable giving message | 1.49\*\* | 1.77\*\*\* | 0.90 | 1.14 |
|  | (0.74) | (0.75) | (0.86) | (0.88) |
| Female |  | 2.71\*\*\* |  | 2.75\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.77) |  | (0.77) |
| HIT approval rating |  | -0.43 |  | -0.51 |
|  |  | (0.37) |  | (0.38) |
| HITs per week buckets |  | -0.30 |  | -0.29 |
|  |  | (0.36) |  | (0.36) |
| Volunteer & donate |  |  | -2.06\* | -2.60\*\* |
|  |  |  | (1.07) | (1.08) |
| (Char. giving message) x (Volunteer & donate) |  |  | 2.39 | 2.78+ |
|  |  |  | (1.69) | (1.70) |
| Constant | 5.82\*\*\* | 48.01 | 6.33\*\*\* | 55.87 |
|  | (0.50) | (37.47) | (0.60) | (37.83) |
| N | 568 | 544 | 568 | 544 |

Estimated coefficients of regressions are reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

+ Significant at 15%, \*Significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1% based on two-sided tests.

**Table 3. Worker characteristics: summary statistics, by condition (randomization**

**balance)**

**Field Experiment 2 (Elance)**

Means are reported with standard deviations in parentheses in Columns 1 and 2.

In Column 3, chi-squared test results are reported for Female and geographic location variables. Independent sample t-test results are reported for all other variables. Statistical significance is robust to the use of alternate statistical tests.

N=70, except for Income (N=69), and Prosocial Orientation (N=66).

**Table 4. OLS regression results**

**Field Experiment 2 (Elance)**

**DV: Number of unrequired data entries completed**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|  | (H1) | (H1) | (H2) | (H2) |
| Charitable giving message | 124.67 | 183.51\* | -1135.99\* | -0.20 |
|  | (183.43) | (97.49) | (644.54) | (132.00) |
| Female |  | -28.08 | -78.61 | -47.57 |
|  |  | (98.24) | (102.84) | (103.08) |
| Performance on previous Elance jobs |  | 148.79\*\*\* | 157.80\*\*\* | 127.38\*\*\* |
|  |  | (32.30) | (32.89) | (31.80) |
| Earnings from previous Elance jobs |  | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* | 0.04\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| From Central or South America |  | -18.97 | 42.60 | -3.20 |
|  |  | (103.84) | (118.15) | (113.06) |
| Continuous Prosocial Scale |  |  | -156.56 |  |
|  |  |  | (143.50) |  |
| (Char. giving message) x (C. Prosocial Scale) |  |  | 318.54\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (152.75) |  |
| Above Median Prosocial Scale (Y=1, N=0) |  |  |  | -68.21 |
|  |  |  |  | (136.56) |
| (Char. giving message) x (Above Median Prosocial Scale) |  |  |  | 364.97\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (180.37) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 183.43\*\*\* | -651.68 | 653.73\*\*\* | -500.6\*\* |
|  | (60.83) | (174.16) | (162.82) | (202.89) |
| N | 70 | 70 | 66 | 66 |

Estimated coefficients of OLS regressions are reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*Significant at 10%, \*\*significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1% based on two-sided tests.

**Table 5. Participant characteristics: summary statistics, by condition (randomization**

**balance)**

**Vignette Experiment (AMT)**

****

Means are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. Bolded means indicate a statistically significant difference of the mean value to that of the condition No Corp Phil & Felt Distant. Corresponding p-values are indicated: \*p<0.10, \*\*p<0.05.

**Table 6. Mean reported perception of closeness to gig employer**

**Vignette Experiment (AMT)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **Charitable Giving Treatment** | |  |
|  |  | **Yes** | **No** |
| **Prior Distance Felt Towards Employer** | **Close** | 5.36 (1.21) | 5.19 (1.14) | *p>0.10* |
| **Distant** | 3.06 (1.33) | 2.35 (1.15) | *p<0.001* |
|  | | *p<0.001* | *p<0.001* |  |

**Table 7. OLS regression results**

**DV: Perceived Closeness to gig employer**

**Vignette Experiment (AMT)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|  | (H3) | (H3) | (H4) | (H4) |
| Charitable giving message | 0.49\*\* | 0.49\*\* | 0.70\*\*\* | 0.71\*\*\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0219) |
| Proportion of work that is gig work |  | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |
|  |  | (0.00) |  | (0.00) |
| Republican |  | 0.04 |  | 0.07 |
|  |  | (0.23) |  | (0.17) |
| Independent |  | 0.35 |  | -0.10 |
|  |  | (0.23) |  | (0.16) |
| Volunteered and donated in past year |  | -0.05 |  | -0.06 |
|  |  | (0.22) |  | (0.16) |
| Previously felt close to employer |  |  | 2.85\*\*\* | 2.87\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.18) | (0.18) |
| (Char. giving message) x (Previously Felt Close to Employer) | |  | -0.54\*\* | -0.56\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.26) | (0.27) |
| Constant | 3.72\*\*\* | 3.76\*\*\* | 2.35\*\*\* | 2.47\*\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.22) | (0.12) | (0.17) |
| N | 347 | 347 | 347 | 347 |

Estimated coefficients of OLS regressions are reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01 based on two-sided tests.

**Endnotes**

1. Schwartz, J., Bohdal-Speigelhoff, U., Gretczko, M., & Sloan, N. (2016, February 29). The gig economy: Distraction or disruption? Deloitte Insights.

   Accenture. (2013). *Trends reshaping the future of HR: The rise of the extended workforce*. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Also supported by Accenture (2013). *Trends reshaping the future of HR: The rise of the extended workforce*. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. These studies have examined a related type of worker, the virtual worker, whose motivation has been pointed out to be different from that of the traditional employee, as well as understudied. Certainly, not all virtual workers are gig workers (virtual workers include full-time employees who telecommute, for example). However, as they fall along the spectrum of workers who could be considered on the border of or outside the boundary of the firm, the research on these workers is relevant to that of gig workers. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Elance has merged with ODesk and has been rebranded as Upwork since the time of the study [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. The Economist (2015, January 3). There’s an app for that. The Economist Group Limited. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. A survey of 50 US-based individuals who have worked as both gig and full-time workers in the past 2 years, administed through Qualtrics Panel, supports the notion that perceived distance from the employer is greater when working as a gig worker than when working fulltime. Workers were asked to indicate on a scale of 1-5, how physically distant they feel from their gig employer and from their fulltime employer (from very physically distant to very physically close). Mean response for fulltime employer was 3.53. Mean response for gig employer was 2.54. P-value of test to reject the null that means are equivalent: p=0.0000. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. The job description was titled “Gather 10 data points from a historical weather website and answer a short survey.” This study took place in August 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Sample question: “In New York City, New York on Jan 1, 2010, what was the Actual Max Temperature (in Fahrenheit)?” [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. A comparison of amount of extra data points completed amongst 150 MTurk workers randomly assigned to three variations of the control group message showed statistical equivalence in the number of optional data points completed (p<0.10 on coefficients of OLS regressions with robust standard errors). The messages for each of the variations of control conditions was as follows: 1) for the generic employer info condition – “In the meantime, we’d like to tell you a bit about our company. At {firm name omitted}, we are a company that provides excellent service to our customers;” 2) for the generic charitable giving condition – “In the meantime, we wanted to share that we found it interesting that donations to charities were up last year in the US.”; 3) for the no-information condition – blank. Mean number of optional data points completed by condition were as follows: 1) for the control company condition mean 7.25, std. dev 9.16, N=55; for generic charitable giving condition mean 7.61, std. dev. 9.36, N=38; for no information condition mean 7.9, std.dev. 9.19, N=56. The statistical equivalence of a no information condition with a generic company and generic giving information condition suggests that the findings reported in this study are not driven by providing some sort of information about the employer (as opposed to no information), or by priming a charitable or giving mindset more generally. More detailed results are available from the author upon request. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. This is a common cutoff on AMT to ensure high quality results. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. All workers whose AMT IDs were associated with a previous job by the same employer were excluded from completing this job, so it is unlikely that these workers actually worked for this employer before. It is possible that a worker created a new AMT ID, however, so these observations are dropped. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Likelihood of finishing was 0.94 for the control group and 0.96 for the CSR treatment groupt(595) = -0.96, *p* = 0.34. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. OLS regression results are reported because of their ease of interpretation. The direction and significance of the coefficients of the variables of interest are robust to the use of Poisson and ordered probit regressions. These are available from the author upon request. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. A two-way Anova confirms this (F(1, 535), p=0.12). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. IRB approval was obtained. The study took place in May 2015. I used a slightly modified version of the job description (and language indicating extra work) posted by a start-up organization on Elance the year before this study was conducted, with the organization’s approval. The posting requested the top 50 Twitter users per category for a number of categories and countries. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. The cutoff for acceptable bid amount was determined in consultation with the collaboring start-up organization that frequented Elance for its hiring needs. This resulted in not hiring individuals who bid the amounts of $140, $165, $300, $250.01, and $438.36. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. They were informed that answering these questions was optional and would not influence their working relationship with the hiring firm. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. In the Elance experiment, I employ a different control condition that that of the AMT experiment. In the AMT experiment, the control group received less information about the employer, which takes less time to read. A possible alternative explanation for the main effects between the control and treatment groups could thus be an information-effect, though it seems unlikely that prosocial inclination would moderate the main treatment effect if it were indeed being driven by the increased amount of information. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that prosocially oriented individuals would be more responsive to a greater amount of information than the non-prosocially oriented. Furthermore, a supplementary study confirmed no apparent effect of greater employer information provision on willingness to complete extra work (see Endnote 8 for more detail). Nonetheless, to ensure results are not being driven by an information-effect, in the following Elance study, the control group receives generic information about the employer, rather than receiving no information about the employer. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. In cases where workers provided even *more* additional entries from other websites, their responses are coded as the maximum amount available on the website provided (1081), since assessing whether or not those additional entries are helpful to the hirer is not obvious. If those entries are coded as extra additional entries, the results presented in the results section become even stronger. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. This geographic control is thus included in the regressions reported in field experiment 2’s Results section. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Prosocial orientation rating is the average of responses to 5-point Likert scale questions commonly used to assess individuals’ prosocial motivation taken from Grant (2008); Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with these statements: “I care about benefitting others”; “I want to help others”; “It is important to me to do good for others.” [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Certainly, there is selection into the larger sample of workers hired on AMT or Elance. However, there is no selection into the treatment or control groups; this is controlled for in these studies. The use of field experiments to control for selection and observe causal relationships have been identified as a promising way to move forward our understanding of inputs of interest and antecedents of firm performance (Chatterji et al., 2016) as well as our understanding of socially responsible initiatives (Delmas & Aragon-Correa, 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Based on interviews with managers who work with both full-time and gig workers. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)